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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51,
provides that a railroad is liable in damages for injuries to
railroad employees “resulting in whole or in part” from the
railroad’s negligence. Respondents prevailed in a jury trial
brought pursuant to FELA against petitioner based on injuries
resulting from petitioner’s negligence in exposing respondents
to asbestos at the workplace. The questions presented are:
1. Whether the trial judge properly instructed the jury that a
plaintiff railroad employee who has a reasonable fear of cancer
because he is suffering from a physical disease caused by the
defendant railroad employer’s negligently exposing the plaintiff
to asbestos is entitled to be compensated for that mental injury
under FELA.
2. Whether the trial judge properly declined to instruct the
jury in a FELA lawsuit to apportion damages between the
defendant railroad employer and absent third parties where the
plaintiff railroad employees were suffering from indivisible
injuries caused by the railroad’s negligence.
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STATEMENT
Petitioner Norfolk & Western Railway Company seeks to
overturn a jury verdict reached after a two week trial in a
negligence action brought in a West Virginia state trial court by
respondents pursuant to the Federal Employer’s Liability Act
(FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51. The jury found that petitioner
negligently exposed respondents, six former railway workers,
to asbestos while in petitioner’s employment and that they were
each suffering from a physical disease (asbestosis) that had been
caused by that exposure. The trial court denied petitioner’s
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new
trial and the state supreme court denied review.
I. Background: Asbestos, Asbestosis, and Cancer
Asbestos refers to a family of crystalline hydrated silicates
that are strong, flexible, resistant to heat, and very durable.
Because of these physical characteristics, asbestos was used by
many industries during the 19th and 20th centuries, especially for
fireproofing and insulation. As trumpeted by one early industry
publication, asbestos “[s]o closely * * * fit the needs of this new
world of steam, electricity and blazing furnaces, that it seems to
have been almost purposely designed.” Johns-Manville, Inc.,
Johns-Manville Service to Railroads, 5 (1923). Railroads used
asbestos in their steam locomotives because asbestos kept the
heat in the boiler. Railroad workers wired layers of asbestos
blocks around the boilers and then used a cement mix of
asbestos powder and water to fill in the gaps. Railroads also
used asbestos in brake linings, pipes, and roofings. JA155-56;
App., infra A1-A2 (trial exhibit photos of asbestos on engines).
Railroads, such as petitioner, overhauled the steam
locomotive engines every few years. The areas of greatest
exposure to asbestos were in the rooms where the overhauling
took place. To overhaul an engine, the asbestos would be
stripped off, collected from the floor, ground up, reprocessed
back into an asbestos-mud, and finally reapplied to the engine.
The entire process led to clouds of asbestos dust. Other major
sources of asbestos exposure were working steam engines,
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overhead pipes, and roofing. JA 155-56.
Asbestos is hazardous to human health because the small size
and shape of its fibers allow their entry into the small airways
in the lower areas of the lungs. The lungs extract oxygen from
the air and move it into the bloodstream for transportation
throughout the body. The lung is very flexible because it
contains elastic, very thin connective tissue that allows the
oxygen in the air to be breathed in and out by the lungs for
diffusion into the blood stream. JA 85-88.
Breathing in asbestos fibers can cause asbestosis -- diffuse
interstitial fibrosis of the lungs -- because of the particular way
that lung tissue reacts to the presence of asbestos fibers that
reach the air spaces within the lung. As the number of fibers
increases, the lung is unable to rid itself of the fibers and the
lung responds to their presence by forming scar tissue in a
process called “fibrosis.”
This scar tissue impairs the
respiration capacity of the lungs in two distinct respects. First,
as the otherwise thin walls become thickened with scar tissue,
the lung itself become stiff and inflexible. This stiffness restricts
an individual’s ability to breathe. Second, the diffusion capacity
of the lung becomes compromised because oxygen and carbon
dioxide cannot move as efficiently through an area with scar
tissue. The air spaces that contain the tiny capillary blood
vessels responsible for spreading oxygen throughout the body
become blocked by the scar tissue. JA 85-92; App, infra, A3-A11.
Only a small percentage of those who are exposed to asbestos
fibers get asbestosis. Whether asbestosis results depends on
many factors, such as the intensity of exposure, duration of
exposure, circumstances of exposure, fiber type, and individual
susceptibility. Approximately one-third of the lung needs to be
scarred before asbestosis is detectable by chest x-ray, with an
average latency period between exposure and the disease of
twenty years. Asbestosis is generally a progressive disease,
meaning it continues to worsen long after the initial period of
exposure is over. The fibers remain in the lung and the amount
of scarring can increase over time. JA 87-88, 91-92, 150, 211,
421, 457; Trial Trans. 147-48 (4/15/98).1
1

The scarring that results from asbestosis is distinct from scarring on
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Medical diagnosis of asbestosis generally requires application
of a series of criteria set forth by the American Thoracic Society
(ATS). Because it is too harmful to the patient to obtain samples
of lung tissue for direct analysis, the ATS sets forth two
necessary elements and four specific medical inquiries of
“recognized value” to support a diagnosis of asbestosis. The
medical profession has further developed a series of
examinations that a doctor can pass in order to be certified as
possessing particular expertise for determining from a chest xray whether a patient has a pulmonary lung disease such as
asbestosis and, if so, the disease’s current stage. JA146-47, 15867, 178, 198-99, 239; App., infra, A11-A21 (ATS guidelines).
The most common physical symptom of asbestosis is
progressively worsening shortness of breath, which can be
extremely debilitating. See note 10 infra. This sensation is
directly linked to marked decrease in lung flexibility and
reduction in diffusion capacity. Asbestosis can itself be fatal as
the degree of the scarring and lung impairment increases over
time. There is no effective treatment. JA 85, 87-92, 150, 464.
There are two major forms of cancer caused by asbestos
exposure. The first, mesothelioma, is a cancer of the lining of
the lung and is a very painful disease that is almost always fatal.
The second form is lung cancer. It is currently not possible to
predict with reasonable medical certainty that any exposed
person will develop either cancer. JA 93, 96, 154.
Persons suffering from asbestosis, however, are far more
likely to get both types of cancer than those without asbestosis,
because their asbestosis confirms the intensity of their exposure,
the extent of lung infiltration, and their body’s particular
adverse reaction to the fibers’ presence, which varies by
individual. For lung cancer, many scientists believe (including
petitioner’s own expert) that the increased risk is present only
the lining of the lung, which is called “pleural plaque.” Unlike asbestosis,
pleural plaque does not infiltrate the lung and does not, standing alone,
generally cause lung impairment. The physical damage caused by
asbestosis is physically distinct from that caused by smoking. Smoking
impairs the ability of an individual to exhale (expiration), while asbestosis
impairs the ability to inhale (inspiration). JA 90-91, 216, 421-23
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for those with asbestosis and not for those just exposed to
asbestos.2 Although that is not true for mesothelioma, ten
percent of those with asbestosis die of mesothelioma. Thirtynine percent of patients with asbestosis who smoke die of lung
cancer, compared to lung cancer rates of only ten to fifteen
percent for smokers who have not even been exposed to
asbestos. The lung cancer rate for nonsmokers exposed to
asbestos is between two and five percent. JA 92-97, 470-71.
II.

Proceedings Below

This action is a consolidation of the complaints filed by
respondents, six former railway employees, in the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County, West Virginia, against petitioner Norfolk
& Western under FELA for injuries allegedly caused by
petitioner’s negligence in exposing respondents to asbestos.
Because the trial resulted in a jury verdict in respondents’ favor,
the trial evidence must now be considered in the light most
favorable to respondents, which means the Court “must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of [respondents]” and
“disregard all evidence favorable to the [petitioner] that the jury
[wa]s not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 151 (2000).
1. At trial, respondents, all West Virginia residents who
worked for petitioner in West Virginia, established that because
of petitioner’s negligent conduct they were each substantially
exposed to asbestos while in petitioner’s employment and are
now suffering from asbestosis as a result. All the respondents
worked for significant periods of time in those employment
See Andrew Churg & Francis Green, Pathology of Occupational Lung
Disease, (1987) (“It should be appreciated that asbestosis is the only
generally accepted indicator of an asbestos etiology for lung cancer.”).
Although petitioner’s own expert agreed (J.A. 470) that the increased risk
of lung cancer exists only for those exposed individuals who have
asbestosis, other reputable scientists believe that those exposed but
without asbestosis also face heightened cancer risks, simply much less so.
E.g., Kevin Browne, Is Asbestos or Asbestosis the Cause of the Increased Risk
of Lung Cancer in Asbestos Workers? 43 British J.Indus. Med. 145 (1986).
2

5
areas where concentrations of asbestos fibers in the air were
especially high, including where asbestos was directly handled
and where asbestos was stripped off and reapplied to steam
engines.3 “[T]errible” and “extreme” clouds of asbestos dust
resulted from those practices. JA 340. Respondents were also
exposed to asbestos from pipes, freight houses, brakes, and
operating steam engines in working for petitioner. JA 112, 19293, 198, 201, 205, 282-86, 303-04.4
Each respondent is suffering from asbestosis according to
objective medical diagnoses performed by a Board-certified
medical expert in pulmonary and lung disease who is also
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health-certified
to read chest x-rays for the diagnosis of asbestosis. The
diagnoses rely on the necessary threshold facts that each
respondent was subjected to substantial asbestos exposure and
Respondents Vance, Ayers, Johnson, and Butler all worked where the
asbestos stripping and reapplication occurred (JA 102-07, 112, 167-68, 198,
201, 266-73, 303-04, 328); respondent Shirley handled asbestos sheets and
cleaned up broken bags of asbestos (JA 192-93, 282-86); and respondent
Spangler was directly involved in the stripping and the application of
asbestos on the engines (JA 205, 338-39). See P. Tr. Exhibs. 2-3. Photos,
App., infra A1-A2. Almost all of the respondents were employed for
decades by petitioner, ranging over 4, 5, 14, 30, and 38 years (JA 106, 192,
198, 201, 205), except for respondent Butler. Although Butler was subject
to asbestos exposure for only three months in petitioner’s employment,
and further exposed in his future employment as a pipefitter, Butler’s
exposure at petitioner’s workplace was especially intense. He worked
during that time in the repair shop in close proximity to where asbestos
was stripped and reapplied and where, as a result, the air he inhaled was
exceedingly dusty with asbestos fibers. JA 249-50.
3

Although petitioner learned of the public health hazards of asbestos
exposure in the workplace beginning in the 1930s, petitioner took none
of the industry-recommended precautions on behalf of any respondent.
Petitioner did not advise any of them of asbestos hazards. Petitioner did
not tell respondents how to reduce the amount of asbestos dust in the air
or otherwise make the workplace less hazardous. Respondents were not
told to wet down the dust or instructed to wear masks or respirators of
any kind. Finally, petitioner did not take any dust measurements during
respondents’ employment or promote respondents’ obtaining chest x-rays.
JA 113-14, 252-53, 293-94, 343-44.
4
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a sufficient amount of time has elapsed since that exposure for
asbestosis to develop. Most tellingly, the diagnoses are based
on the ATS-established diagnostic tests of “recognized value.”5
Respondents are suffering from serious physical and mental
injuries because of asbestosis and their impairment is
progressively worsening. One respondent stated that his
“shortness of breath” meant that he “just can’t breath. * * * I just
feel like I’m gonna fall dead * * *.” JA 114. Others explained that
the physical effect was so debilitating that they could not “walk
a distance” or could walk only about a block. JA 262, 276, 330.
One respondent requires six minutes to walk 110 feet to get the
mail and back, after which he has to sit down and rest. JA 206,
356. The impact on another respondent’s lung is so severe that
The chest x-rays of each respondent reveal asbestosis of the lung. JA
178-81, 184, 193, 198, 199, 202, 204, 205-06. For respondent Spangler, the
asbestosis has already progressed to an even more advanced stage, but the
disease is likely to worsen for all respondents over time. JA 206; see id. at
171, 186, 195, 198, 203. Five respondents also suffered from diffusion
impairment consistent with asbestosis. JA 169-70, 193-94, 200, 202, 206.
Physical examination of the lungs, using a stethoscope, revealed rale
sounds in the chests of several respondents, including the one whose
diffusion capacity appeared normal, which further corroborated
asbestosis. JA 168-69, 184, 193. At trial, a medical expert testified that
some respondents also exhibited lung damage from smoking, but that the
evidence of asbestosis -- especially the chest x-rays and diffusion
impairment -- was physically distinct for diagnostic purposes from that
caused by either smoking or pleural plaques. JA 171, 185, 189, 202, 208-09.
Petitioner improperly now tries to relitigate the facts and in doing so
misstates the trial evidence. Respondents’ expert did not “concede[] the
absence of ATS-recommended criteria” for respondent Ayers. Pet. Br. 7 &
n.6. The expert found those criteria met. JA 201-03. Petitioner’s reference
to “corrected” diffusing capacity is misleading because, as established at
trial, this so-called correction does not measure for asbestosis impairment,
which is why it is not used by the ATS guidelines for measuring
respiratory impairment Petitioner’s own expert conceded just that. JA
165-66, 477-78, 483, 522-23. Petitioner is likewise mistaken in now
contending (Br. 4 n.3) that a lung profusion reading of 1/1 is required to
support a diagnosis of asbestosis. The evidence at trial established that a
1/0 reading is sufficient evidence of abnormality to support an asbestosis
diagnosis according to the author of the ATS guidelines and to both
petitioner’s and respondents’ medical experts. JA 199, 240, 432, 460.
5
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“no matter what I do, I could just be talking and I’ll run plum
out of breath.” JA 294-95.
At trial, respondents established the seriousness of the mental
injuries caused by their asbestosis. In addition to the obvious
trauma from their growing physical incapacity to engage in
normal life activities, there was testimony about the emotional
trauma directly linked to shortness of breath. Respondent
Spangler described how his worsening condition was causing
him emotional distress. JA 357. Respondent Shirley stated it
was making “a nervous wreck out of me” and he “g[o]t
depressed sometimes.” JA 298.
Respondents also proved at trial both their fear of getting
either lung cancer or mesothelioma and the reasonableness of
that fear based on their asbestosis. There was trial testimony
regarding the significantly enhanced risk of those cancers for
those with asbestosis (see pp. 3-4, supra), as well as the mental
injury caused by the knowledge of those risks. There was also
testimony that respondents were the kind of individuals who
understated their fears. JA 116, 255, 277, 299, 331, 354.
2. During jury selection, the trial judge granted respondents’
motion that petitioner not be allowed either to refer in voir dire
or to introduce at trial evidence of other lawsuits or settlements
that respondents may have filed against or entered into with
other parties relating to their asbestos-related injuries. Trial Tr.
32-38, 148-49 (April 13, 1998); JA 66-73. In considering the
motion, the trial judge repeatedly questioned whether petitioner
was planning to introduce evidence of the negligence of other
tortfeasors in support of apportionment of fault and, if not,
what did petitioner suggest the jury was “going to apportion
with?.” JA 69. Petitioner denied intent to introduce evidence
with respect to manufacturers and mentioned only the
possibility of “apportionment” based on the fact that several
respondents were smokers. JA 68-71. The trial court’s order
pertained only to evidence of the filing of other lawsuits and
settlements, and it did not preclude petitioner from introducing
evidence of the culpability of manufacturers or nonrailroad
employers. See JA 126 (“evidence that [respondents] have sued
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the manufacturers and might have received settlement”).6
3. Petitioner also requested two jury instructions that the trial
judge denied. Petitioner requested an instruction that there
could be no award of “damages to plaintiff for fear of cancer”
unless the jury found both that (1) “he has an actual likelihood
of developing cancer” and (2) “he has experienced physical
manifestations caused by fear of developing cancer.” JA 548.
Petitioner did not contend (as it does now) that physical
manifestations would suffice for recovery or that mental injury
must be “severe.” The trial judge instead instructed the jury
that “any plaintiff who has demonstrated that he has developed
a reasonable fear of cancer that is related to proven physical
injury from asbestos is entitled to be compensated for that fear
as a part of the damages you award for pain and suffering” for
that physical injury. JA 573. The judge further instructed that
because “none of the plaintiffs have offered evidence that he
actually has cancer or that he will, with reasonable certainty
develop cancer in the future. * * * [Y]ou cannot award damages
to plaintiffs for cancer or for increased risk of cancer.” Id.
The trial judge also denied petitioner’s “apportionment”
instruction. Petitioner requested that the jury be instructed that
if it finds that the “plaintiff in this case has a condition or
disease which was caused by his employment with employers
other than the railroad, plaintiff’s recovery must be limited to
only such damages as result from his railroad employment and
he cannot recover damages which have been or will be caused
by his non-railroad employment.” JA 539. Petitioner further
Other evidence related to manufacturers denied admission by the trial
judge was certain evidence concerning when manufacturers warned
petitioner of asbestos hazards. Petitioner, however, sought to argue that
the manufacturers were nonnegligent in lacking knowledge of asbestos
hazards and, based on that alleged factual premise, hoping to persuade
the jury that petitioner was likewise nonnegligent. See JA 127 (“The
purported evidence would be that [the manufacturers] didn’t warn
because the general state-of-the-art was such that nobody knew enough
to do anything.). In denying petitioner the freedom to suggest that the
manufacturers were nonnegligent, the judge did not limit petitioner’s
ability to introduce evidence of manufacturer negligence, which both
respondents and the court agreed was in bountiful supply. See JA 126-37.
6
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proposed a verdict form that would have allowed the jury to
allocate percentages of damages to petitioner, each respondent
(based on smoking), and “Other Employment.” JA 550-60
The trial judge instead instructed the jury that plaintiff’s
recovery should be “reduced” and “not * * * barred” if the jury
found that “a plaintiff was negligent and that plaintiff’s
negligence caused in whole or in part, the plaintiff’s lung
impairment or injury.” The verdict forms provided by the
judge accordingly allowed the jury to determine the
“percentage of negligence” attributable to “each of the parties”
in the event that the jury first found any of them contributorily
negligent. JA 578-79, 582-83, 586-87. The court further
instructed the jury that it was no defense to petitioner’s liability
that there “may be more than one cause to any injury.” JA 568.
4. The jury reached verdicts in favor of respondents, but
reduced damages for three respondents based on their
comparative negligence by smoking. The reductions were 37,
31, and 14 percent, amounting to a $776,954.44 overall decrease.
The judge further reduced the verdicts to account for
settlements that respondents had entered into with other nonFELA entities. The damages ultimately awarded in the final
judgments totaled $4,891,603.20. See JA 590-613; Order
Modifying Judgment (9/22/99). The judge subsequently
denied petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. Pet. App. 3a-4a.
5. The West Virginia Supreme Court denied discretionary
review. Pet. App. 1a-2a.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner sets forth two claims. Petitioner’s first claim is that
the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award any damages
based on fear of cancer. Petitioner’s second claim is that the
trial court erred in holding petitioner liable for all of
respondents’ injuries rather than instructing the jury to
apportion damages between petitioner and other non-party
tortfeasors who may also have contributed to those injuries.
Neither of these contentions has any merit. Both are premised
on a misreading of settled tort doctrine, which supports the jury
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instructions in all respects. Both also run afoul of the Federal
Employer’s Liability Act (FELA), which Congress enacted in
order to expand a plaintiff’s ability to recover for injuries caused
by a railroad’s negligence. Finally, petitioner misapprehends
this Court’s role in reviewing trial proceedings and jury verdicts
by repeatedly questioning the sufficiency of the evidence at trial
and by introducing new evidence and new arguments not
presented at trial. The judgment of the trial court should,
accordingly, be affirmed, or the Court may wish to dismiss the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
1. Petitioner’s first contention contravenes settled tort
doctrine that permits recovery of damages for reasonablyincurred mental injuries where, as in this case, the basis of those
injuries is a physical injury caused by the defendants’
negligence. Contrary to petitioner’s repeated insistence, this
case, unlike Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S.
424 (1997), does not involve a stand-alone tort claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Respondents are not
relying on mere “asbestos exposure” in support of their claim
for recovery of mental injuries. Nor are they asserting those
mental injuries as what establishes their tort cause of action in
the first instance.
Respondents alleged and proved at trial that they each suffer
from a serious, debilitating physical disease -- asbestosis -caused by petitioner’s negligent conduct, and petitioner cannot
and “does not challenge” (Br. 2) the jury’s finding of asbestosis.
Respondents further established at trial the reasonableness of
their fear, arising from their asbestosis, that they may suffer in
the future from two painful and potentially fatal forms of
cancer: mesothelioma and lung cancer. The evidence was
uncontradicted at trial that those who, like respondents, suffer
from asbestosis are significantly more likely to develop these
cancers than those who do not, including those who have been
only exposed to asbestos.
Pursuant to the trial judge’s
instruction, the jury concluded that respondents’ fear of cancer
was in fact reasonably related to their asbestosis and the
sufficiency of that evidence can no longer be fairly questioned.
Based on traditional and longstanding tort doctrine, recovery
for such mental injuries is permissible under FELA. Once a
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plaintiff establishes that the defendant’s conduct has caused a
physical injury, such as a serious physical disease from asbestos
exposure, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all reasonably
foreseeable physical and mental injuries proximately resulting
from the same “conduct which cause[d]” the initial injury. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 456 (1965). The physical disease
in that circumstance satisfies the “injury” element necessary for
the tort cause of action, and the mental injuries are merely an
aspect of damages for an otherwise established tort.
Nor is there anything about the jury verdict to suggest that
respondents’ asbestosis was merely a pretext for a damage
award based mostly on respondents’ fear of cancer. Wholly
apart from fear of cancer, the evidence at trial established the
seriousness of respondents’ asbestosis and its debilitating and
progressively worsening impact on their daily lives. Indeed,
none of the respondents sought to prove that their fear of cancer
was their most substantial injury, and at least one even
expressly denied just that. Because, moreover, petitioner failed
to seek or obtain a jury verdict that reveals how much was
awarded for fear of cancer, petitioner cannot now presume that
the jury awarded too much on that one ground.
2. FELA’s plain terms and settled tort law also contradict
petitioner’s second claim that the trial court erred by not
instructing the jury to apportion damages between petitioner
and absent third parties who may have contributed to the
injuries of two respondents. FELA and tort law permit a
plaintiff to recover his entire damages from a defendant whose
negligence jointly causes indivisible personal injuries, such as
a physical disease, while allowing the defendant to seek
contribution from other tortfeasors.
FELA expressly imposes liability on petitioner so long as its
negligence caused respondents’ injuries “in part.” 45 U.S.C. §
51. As repeatedly stressed by this Court, this statutory standard
is met when the “employer negligence played any part, even
the slightest, in producing the injury * * *. It does not matter
that, from the evidence, the jury may also with reason, on
grounds of probability, attribute the result to other causes * * *.”
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957). In
contrast to FELA’s adoption of comparative negligence, FELA
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does not provide that a plaintiff’s recovery must be reduced
because other nonrailroad sources contributed to the plaintiff’s
indivisible injuries. Neither the common law in existence at the
time of FELA’s enactment nor the weight of common law
authorities today dictate otherwise. Respondents’ personal
injuries resulting from asbestosis are classic “indivisible”
injuries for which apportionment is not compelled.
Even if, contrary to our submission, FELA’s plain language
and applicable common law doctrine do not preclude
apportionment for the type of indivisible physical and
reasonable mental injuries resulting from asbestosis, petitioner
cannot prevail by now claiming that a reasonable basis for
apportionment exists. The burden of establishing any such
“reasonable basis” necessarily falls on petitioner as the
defendant. Here, however, petitioner made no such showing
at trial, notwithstanding multiple opportunities to do so.
3. Although petitioner pays nominal lip-service to the
irrefutable notion that, before this Court, petitioner may neither
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence before the jury nor
present new evidence not introduced at trial, petitioner’s brief
is riddled with efforts to do just that. Petitioner never accounts
for the fact that all reasonable evidentiary inferences must now
be made in respondents’ favor as the prevailing parties at trial.
With regard to the first question presented, petitioner (1)
questions whether respondents in fact suffer from asbestosis by
repeatedly stressing the possibility of its misdiagnosis; (2) offers
new evidence that asbestosis is not a serious debilitating
disease; and (3) presents new evidence that respondents’ fear of
cancer is not reasonable. Petitioner’s arguments on the
apportionment issue are similarly infected by illegitimate
factual allegations. Petitioner relies on fact evidence that could
have been (but was not) introduced at trial to support a finding
that a reasonable basis for apportionment of liability exists.
Petitioner is not entitled to a new trial based on its
hypothetical notions of what it should have done at trial.
Undoubtedly, there is room for “Brandeis Brief” presentations
in cases raising legal issues where such historical facts may be
legally relevant. Here, however, the Court has decided to
review the propriety of a jury verdict and jury instructions that
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were based on the evidence actually presented at trial. A party
cannot introduce new evidence to impeach that verdict or those
instructions or invite this Court to review the sufficiency of the
evidence. For this reason, the Court may wish to consider
dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY THAT A PLAINTIFF WHO HAS A REASONABLE
FEAR OF CANCER BECAUSE HE IS SUFFERING
FROM A PHYSICAL DISEASE CAUSED BY THE
DEFENDANT’S NEGLIGENCE IS ENTITLED TO
RECOVER FOR THAT MENTAL INJURY AS PART OF
HIS OVERALL DAMAGES
The trial judge in this case properly instructed the jury that
“any plaintiff who has demonstrated a reasonable fear of cancer
that is related to proven physical injury from asbestosis is
entitled to be compensated for that fear as a part of the damages
you may award for pain and suffering.” JA 573. The trial
judge’s instructions were valid in all respects.
It is
longstanding, settled tort law that where, as in this case, a
plaintiff has established that defendant’s negligence has
resulted in a physical injury, the plaintiff can recover for all
physical and reasonable mental harms proximately related to
that initial physical injury. For this reason, petitioner’s claim of
jury instruction error is little more than the very kind of
dressed-up sufficiency of the evidence challenge that this Court
has consistently declared inappropriate for plenary review.
A.

Under Settled Tort Law, A Defendant Who
Negligently Causes Physical Injury To The Person Of
Another Is Liable For The Resulting Physical And
Mental Harms, Including Reasonable Apprehension
Of Future Physical Consequences

1. FELA “invests the injured employee with a right to such
damages as will compensate him for his personal loss and
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suffering.” St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 656
(1915). In construing the precise scope of damages recoverable
under FELA, this Court considers, first, “FELA itself, its
purposes and background,” and, second, “because ‘FELA
jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law
developments,’ * * * the common law treatment of the right of
recovery asserted by respondents.” Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1994), quoting Atchison, T. & S.
F. R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987). Although FELA does
not itself answer the question of the scope of physical and
mental injuries for which a negligent defendant is liable, settled
common law principles readily do.
Under settled tort law, where, as in this case, a defendant
negligently causes a physical injury to another person, the
defendant’s liability is not confined to the physical injuries that
immediately result. The initial physical injury satisfies the
“injury” element necessary to establish a prima facie case of
negligence, consisting of “breach of duty, injury and causation”
(Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 550-551). But the defendant is liable for
all physical and mental harms that proximately result from the
threshold physical injury.
The scope of proximate mental injuries that may be recovered
includes “pain and suffering” in the narrowest sense: pain that
arises in the immediate aftermath of a physical wounding. But,
contrary to petitioner’s claim (Br. 15-16), it is not strictly
confined to such immediate, direct pain. “In connection with
proved physical injury, wrongfully caused [emotional
disturbance] has long been an element in recovery, not merely
where undistinguishable from ‘physical pain,’ but in further
removed situations.”
Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 509 (1921).
As described by Dean Prosser in the very first edition of his
Handbook of Torts, “[w]ith a cause of action established by the
physical harm, ‘parasitic’ damages are awarded, and it is
considered that there is sufficient assurance that the mental
injury is not being feigned.” William L. Prosser, Handbook of the
Law of Torts, 213 (1941). Hence, mental injuries that would not,
standing alone, be sufficient to create liability, are recoverable
as “parasitic damages” when they are the result of a physical
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impact that produces a physical injury because the latter
satisfies the “injury” element necessary to establish the tort
cause of action. The essential correctness of this proposition,
both at the time of FELA’s enactment and since, cannot be
seriously questioned.7 As set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 456 (1965): “If the actor’s negligent conduct has so
caused any bodily harm to another as to make him liable for it,
the actor is also subject to liability for * * * fright, shock, or other
emotional disturbance resulting from the bodily harm or the
conduct which causes it * * *” (emphasis supplied).
2. Nor can it be gainsaid that it is has long been settled tort
law that such recoverable mental injuries extend to the
reasonable apprehension of future physical consequences.
“[E]ven if the plaintiff cannot prove that a disease will result in
the future, courts have permitted recovery for reasonable fears
that the impact will inflict some future disease. * * * Such cases
fit the pattern of parasitic damages – emotional harm results
from an initial injury and is recovered as one element of
damages for that injury.” Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, 844
(2000); Thomas G. Shearman & Amasa A. Redfield, III A Treatise
on the Law of Negligence § 761 (6th ed. 1913) (“The mental
suffering which may be allowed for includes such as arises from
the plaintiff’s reflections upon what he personally has to
endure.”). There is simply no merit, therefore, to petitioner’s
contention (Br. 15-16) that mental injury based on fear of future
consequences such as cancer are recoverable only as “standalone negligently inflicted emotional distress.”
Cases involving fear of cancer based on asbestosis did not
exist at the time of FELA’s enactment, but there are plenty of
historical and contemporary analogues in the case law. See
See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1048-49 (1936); Archibald Robinson Watson,
A Treatise on the Law of Damages for Personal Injuries, 500-01 (1901); Francis
H. Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without
Impact, 50 Am. L. Rev. 141, 142 (1902); Thomas A. Street, I The Foundations
of Legal Liability – Theory and Principles of Tort, 460 (1906); Francis H.
Bohlen, I Cases on the Law of Torts 215 (1915); Fowler V. Harper, Readings
in Torts, 1225-26 (1941).
7
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David Minneman, Annot, Future Disease or Condition, or Anxiety
Relating Thereto, As Element of Recovery, 50 A.L.R. 4th 13 (1986).
Perhaps most directly analogous are the legion of dog bite and
blood poisoning cases during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries in which plaintiffs recovered damages both for the
physical wounding of the immediate bite and for the fear of
future disease (rabies, lockjaw) caused by the possibility that
harmful germs were injected into the victim’s bloodstream. The
courts routinely allowed for recovery of mental injury based on
fear of future disease, wholly apart from the physical harm (and
immediate mental harm) caused by the initial wounding itself.
In Ayers v. Macoughtry, 29 Okla. 399 (1911), for instance, the
plaintiff stated simply at trial that he was “in fear of acquiring
[rabies]” and, because of that fear, “there was a good deal of
anxiety, and I experienced it.” Id. at 402. Based on that
testimony, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the trial
court’s instruction to the jury that in determining the amount of
damages, “you may take into consideration the apprehension
of poisoning from the bite of said dog and the fear of evil results
therefrom.” Id. at 404.8 In Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568 (1909),
another dog bite case, the defendant objected to the plaintiff’s
being allowed to testify in response to the question “Have you
any fear now” of rabies, “Yes, sir; I still worry about it.” The
Maryland Supreme Court held that there was no error in
allowing this testimony, relying on an earlier decision of the
Vermont Supreme Court: “‘The apprehension of poison from
the bite of the dog, and the fear and solicitude as to evil results
therefrom -- all pain, anguish, solicitude, occasioned by the bite
-- were proper matters for the jury in estimating the damages.”
Id. at 573, quoting Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251 (1880); Warner v.
Chamberlain, 12 Del. 18, 21 (1884) (“fear and apprehension of
hydrophobia”); Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 299
(1917) (“compensate the mental suffering resulting from the
knowledge that he had been bitten by a mad dog”).
See Heintz v. Caldwell, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 412 (1898) (“we hold that the
court also erred in not permitting the plaintiff to testify to the mental
suffering consequent upon her apprehensions of hydrophobia and lockjaw
resulting from the dogs biting her”).
8
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The courts in these cases carefully distinguished between a
plaintiff’s right to recover for reasonable apprehensions of
future consequences and the right to recover for the future
consequences themselves. The courts specifically upheld the
legitimacy of recovery for the mental injury based on such
apprehensions even when the consequence were themselves too
uncertain to be recoverable. See Bernadsky v. Erie R. Co., 76
N.J.L. 580 (1908). The courts also endorsed the reasonableness
of fears based on microscopic bodily invasions notwithstanding
their potentially lengthy duration: “The ghost of hydrophobia
is raised, not to down during the life-time of the victim.” The
Lord Derby, 17 F. 265, 267 (E.D. La 1883); Gamer v. Winchester,
110 S.W. 2d 1190, 1193 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (“these mental
fears may be considered by the jury”).
3. In none of the longstanding tort law precedent allowing for
recovery of mental injuries related to a physical impact or injury
was there a further requirement that the mental injuries be
“physically manifested.” The mental injuries needed only to be
related to a physical injury, reasonable, and, like injuries of any
kind, supported by evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict.
For that same reason, of course, we do not doubt that a jury is
entitled to consider the absence of physical manifestations as
evidence that a mental injury is less severe and therefore less
deserving of a significant award. In this case, moreover,
petitioner made just such a closing argument to the jury. See JA
576. But the jury’s fair consideration of that argument is all that
tort law requires.
B. A Plaintiff Who Reasonably Fears Cancer Because He
Has Asbestosis May Recover Damages for that Fear From
A Defendant Who Negligently Caused the Asbestosis
1. In Metro-North , this Court ruled that a victim of asbestos
exposure could not recover for mental injuries based on fear of
cancer because exposure to asbestos, alone, did not amount to
the threshold “physical impact” necessary for such recovery. In
the instant case, however, respondents are not the victims of
mere exposure to asbestos. The evidence at trial established
that petitioner’s negligence in exposing respondents to asbestos
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has resulted in their suffering from asbestosis, which is a
serious, debilitating pulmonary lung disease that progressively
worsens over time. Accordingly, under longstanding tort law,
petitioner can prevail only either if (1) asbestosis does not
supply the requisite physical injury or (2) if respondents’ fear of
cancer is not sufficiently related to asbestosis to be a legitimate
additional aspect of damages.
Revealingly, almost none of the lengthy briefs filed by
petitioner and its supporting amici discuss at any length these
essential, threshold legal and factual issues. On the significance
of asbestosis, petitioner can at most muster only a footnote (Br.
21 n.13) that declares, without any elaboration, that this Court
in Metro-North “did not decide that asbestosis, or any specific
asbestos-related disease, would in fact qualify a plaintiff” for
recovery of related mental injury. At least one of petitioner’s
amicus seeks to fill the analytical gap in petitioner’s position,
albeit no more convincingly. According to amicus American
Insurance Association (Br. 17-18), the asbestosis diagnosis does
not change the result because “asbestosis is merely a proxy for
exposure to asbestos.” “[T]he presence of asbestosis – the only
asserted factual difference between this case and Buckley – adds
nothing to the legal analysis.” Id.
Such propositions are simply untenable. The legitimacy and
legal significance of respondents’ asbestosis diagnosis is
incontrovertible. Notwithstanding petitioner’s repeated (and
improper) efforts to cast doubt on the validity and seriousness
of that medical diagnosis,9 the evidence was more than ample
to sustain the jury’s verdict. There was substantial evidence of
respondents’ significant asbestos exposure at petitioner’s
employment. See p. 5, supra. A Board-certified medical expert
applied the consensus American Thoracic Society guidelines in
support of that diagnosis, which even petitioner acknowledges
as “authoritative” (Br. 3) and which carefully distinguishes
See, e.g., Pet. Br. 7 (“accounts of railroad exposure were riddled with
vagueness and imprecision”); id. at 2 (“minimal proof of disease”); id. at
3 (“misdiagnosis is thus common”); id. at 5 (“commonly diagnose those
who manifest even the slightest lung scarring as asbestotic”); id. at 6
(“scant evidence of asbestosis”); id. at 30 (“benign disease”).
9
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between lung impairments caused by asbestos and smoking.
See note 1, supra. Contrary to petitioner’s intimation (Br. 6, 8),
respondents’ asbestosis is not a mere, incidental inconvenience
based on the “slightest lung scarring.” As shown at trial, at
least one-third of the lung must be scarred before asbestosis is
even revealed by an x-ray, its restriction on lung inspiration
capacity causes shortness of breath that significantly restricts
the ability to engage in daily life activities, it worsens over time,
and it is potentially fatal. See pp. 2-3, supra.10
No more subject to dispute before this Court is the jury’s
assessment pursuant to the jury instruction of the relationship
of respondents’ fear of cancer to their asbestosis. The
sufficiency of that evidence is not a proper matter for this
Court’s review. But, in all events, the United States is simply
wrong in asserting (Br. 5, 13) that “any increased risk of cancer
or associated fear is not related to the physical injury that
permits respondents to sue.” The relationship is substantial and
doubly-layered. Asbestosis is what makes respondents’ fear of
cancer reasonable. Indeed, petitioner’s amicus, the American
Insurance Association, correctly acknowledges (Br. 22) that
asbestosis is “logically related” to the reasonableness of the fear
Petitioner’s description of asbestosis -- a “benign disease” lacking
“any severe impairment” and causing “only” shortness of breath (Br. 8,
30) -- sharply contrasts with the description of the disease set forth by the
federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration:
[I]ndividuals with asbestosis experience a relatively long and
debilitating period of morbidity. Dr. Holstein, a pulmonary physician,
described a typical case:
The main symptom of asbestosis is progressive shortness of breath.
When this has its onset in its typically insidious and gradual manner,
the individual thinks that he is just getting older or getting a little
overweight, can't run as fast as he used to, or gets out of breath more
easily than he used to; and attributes it to factors such as the ones I
mentioned. A little later on, the person begins to notice that in fact, he
or she can't do the things that many other people the same age can do.*
* * Eventually, in the very severe cases, a person's life consists of
sitting in an armchair on the ground floor with an oxygen tank, and
disconnecting it just long enough to get up and go to the bathroom.
51 Fed. Reg. 22612, 22622 (1986).
10
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of cancer because “a present injury of asbestosis makes it more
likely than it otherwise would be that a particular plaintiff who
has been exposed to asbestos will eventually develop cancer.”
Nor is that logical relationship insubstantial. As previously
described (pp. 3-4, supra), 10 percent of individuals with
asbestosis contract mesothelioma (cancer of the lining of the
lung); 39 percent of those with asbestosis who also smoke
contract fatal lung cancer, while the rate for nonsmokers with
asbestosis is 2-5 percent, which is still a substantial risk.
Significantly, as petitioner’s own expert agreed at trial, it is a
widely held view that the increased risk of lung cancer applies
only to those who have asbestosis. JA 470; p. 4 & note 2, supra.
The asbestosis confirms the degree of lung infiltration -- “the
highest kinds of exposures” (JA 95) -- as well as a person’s
particular adverse biologic reaction to the fibers.
The second layer of the relationship binding together
respondents’ asbestosis and their fear of cancer is likewise
significant. It derives from the essential fact that asbestosis and
the fear of cancer are both caused by petitioner’s same negligent
conduct, commencing with the infiltration of the respondents’
lungs with asbestos fibers and extending to asbestosis.
Respondents’ fear of cancer is, precisely as contemplated by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, “an emotional disturbance
resulting from * * * the conduct which causes [asbestosis].” See
§ 456. Just as with the cases of dog bites and rabies more than
a century ago, both asbestosis and cancer are caused by the
same negligent conduct and respondents seek recovery only for
damages based on fear and not for the cancer itself.11
Significantly, the relationship between asbestosis and fear of cancer
clearly satisfies even petitioner’s own test of the necessary corroboration
of mental injury, as described in the petition for a writ of certiorari. As set
forth in the “Questions Presented” of its petition, petitioner did not
present the issue as whether emotional injury based on fear of cancer must
be proved by physical manifestations. The petition was instead carefully
written in the disjunctive, expressly allowing for the possibility of “other
corroboration of injury related to their alleged fear of cancer.” Pet. i (emphasis
supplied). Proof of asbestosis, however, supplies just that corroboration
which petitioner acknowledged would be sufficient. It is undeniably both
11
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2. Petitioner and its amici are also mistaken that reasonable
fear of cancer is not recoverable because “asbestosis and cancer
are separate diseases.” Pet. Br. 15-16; U.S. Amicus Br. 5, 11-13.
Respondents did not seek and the trial judge did not permit the
jury to award any damages based on cancer itself. See JA 573.
The “‘separate disease’” rule cited by the United States (Br. 12)
is therefore neither implicated in this case nor inconsistent with
the recovery of damages based on fear of cancer.
The “separate disease” rule originated in cases in which tort
defendants, relying on “the well-established rule that a claim or
cause of action may not be split,” were arguing for “a
judge-made rule that upon manifestation of any harm, the
injured party must then, if ever, sue for all harms the same
exposure may (or may not) occasion some time in the future.”
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117, 119
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Ginsburg, J.).
As proposed by the tort
defendants in those earlier cases, a victim of asbestosis would
have to sue for both asbestosis and for unrealized cancer at the
same (earlier) time and would be able to obtain relief for the
latter only if he could prove that he was then “reasonably
certain” to get cancer. Id. at 120. The unfairness of requiring a
plaintiff to bring a suit, if ever, when the evidence would
invariably be insufficient is what prompted many courts to
adopt the “separate disease” rule, which allows for the statute
of limitations to run for each disease separately. Id. at 120-21.
In this case, however, respondents are not claiming damages
“injury” and it is “related” to the “fear of cancer.” The evidence of
asbestosis, furthermore, is itself corroborated by the very type of
“objective medical evidence” upon which petitioner insists: a detailed
expert medical diagnosis. Perhaps that is why petitioner sought, upon
further reflection, to rewrite the question presented in its subsequent brief
on the merits. Compare Pet. i with Pet. Br. i. Such a rewrite would seem to
implicate the Court’s rules, which allow for the “Question Presented” to
be reworded, but do not allow the petitioner to “change the substance of
the questions already presented.” S.Ct Rule 24.1(a). But, in all events,
petitioner’s effort to revise the question presented is strikingly revealing
of the fundamental weakness of its legal position. The judge’s instruction
to the jury in this case is entirely consistent with petitioner’s original
question. Compare JA 573 with Pet. i.
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for cancer. JA 573. They are instead seeking damages not for a
future physical injury, but for their present mental injury, which
exists whether or not that future physical injury occurs. The
United States is correct that FELA’s “text clearly focuses on
present injuries” (Br. 15), but equal wrong in characterizing
respondents’ mental injury as not “present.” Respondent’s
“fear is happening now.” Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496
N.W.2d 247, 252 (Iowa 1993).
Unlike either petitioner or the United States, the trial judge in
this case correctly distinguished between the reasonable
apprehension of future consequences and the consequences
themselves, allowing recovery only for the former. JA 573. It is
the same distinction evident in the rabies cases discussed above.
It is also, of course, the same distinction that defines the
essential difference between the independent torts of assault
(apprehension of a harmful contact) and battery (harmful
contact). Restatement (Second) Torts, §§ 13, 18, 21.
No inconsistency is presented between the “separate disease”
rule and distinguishing between present and future injury.
Many of the jurisdictions adopting that rule have also allowed
plaintiffs with asbestosis to recover damages for fear of cancer
in their asbestosis claims. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox,
481 So. 2d 517, 521, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Devlin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 563, 567 (1985);
Griffin v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip op. 4
(N.D. Ill. 1990). Those courts all recognize that the present
injury based on reasonable fear is distinct from the future
consequences of cancer and presents no more a problem of
double recovery than does recovery for both assault and
battery. These judicial rulings also avoid the unfairness that
would otherwise result because many current victims of
asbestosis would be unlikely ever to be made whole for their
present mental injuries, such as those victims who die of
asbestosis or other causes before cancer occurs or a lawsuit can
be brought. Most persons die of mesothelioma within 12
months of its diagnosis. See H. Corwin Hinshaw & John F.
Murray, Diseases of the Chest 731-32 (4th ed. 1980).
3. Although this Court did not rule in Metro-North on the
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precise question, the Court’s opinion left little doubt that a
plaintiff with asbestosis could recover damages for reasonable
fear of cancer under FELA. The Court held that FELA “permits
‘recovery of emotional injury’ by ‘those plaintiffs who sustain
a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent
conduct.” 521 U.S. at 430, quoting, Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547-48.
The Court also made clear that under settled tort doctrine, a
disease such as asbestosis would satisfy the threshold physical
injury requirement. The Court both described how “[c]ommon
law courts do permit a plaintiff who suffers from a disease to
recover for negligently caused emotional distress”(521 U.S. at
432 (emphasis supplied)) and affirmatively ruled that a railroad
employee “cannot recover unless, and until, he manifests
symptoms of a disease” (id. at 436 (emphasis supplied)). The
Metro-North opinion even cites favorably to the lower court’s
ruling in Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 30 Ohio Misc.
2d 11 (Ct. Common Pleas, Cayahoga Cty. 1987), which this
Court described as allowing recovery for fear of cancer because
the “emotional distress damages [were] sought by an asbestosisafflicted plaintiff.” 521 U.S. at 437 (emphasis supplied).
Indeed, unlike in this case, the railroad petitioner in MetroNorth and the same amici who support petitioner in this case,
made quite clear in the legal briefs that they filed in Metro-North
that an asbestosis-afflicted plaintiff would be able to recover for
reasonable fear of cancer as part of his overall damages.12 The
American Insurance Association (AIA), amicus both in MetroNorth and here, made explicit its promise to future asbestosisinflicted plaintiffs. The AIA declared in its Metro North amicus
brief (Metro North AIA Amicus Br. 14) that “[t]he question here
is not whether respondent can sue, but when. There is no doubt
that if respondent does, in fact, suffer a physical injury from
exposure to asbestos, he will be able to bring a cause of action
to recover not only for his physical injuries, but also for any

See, e.g., Metro-North Pet. Rep. Br. 18 (“Indeed, if plaintiff’s medical
records contained any objectively verifiable functional impairment, he
would have an old-fashioned personal injury claim, and there would be
no need to talk about a zone of danger test, physical impact, or the like.”).
12
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emotional injury” (emphasis in original and supplied).13
Such acknowledgments were hardly surprising in Metro-North
because of the clarity of settled tort law. What is surprising is
how the petitioner railroad in this case and the same amicus
now claim otherwise. As correctly described by the petitioner
railroad in its Metro-North brief (Br. 20 & n.12), the “better rule
in asbestos cases” is the one “adopted by the overwhelming
majority of courts, namely to restrict recovery for emotional
distress to plaintiffs with actual physical injury caused by
asbestos exposure.” The lower courts have, in fact, routinely
upheld jury instructions that allow a jury to include damages
based on reasonable fear of cancer where, as in this case, “the
exposure to asbestos * * * has already actually resulted in some
physical harm” such as asbestosis. Dobbs, The Law Of Torts,
supra, 844 & n. 5, citing Eagle-Picher Industries v. Cox, 481 So.2d
517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); see, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-415 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc); Griffin
v. Keene Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7424, slip op. 4 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496 N.W.2d 247, 251-53 (Iowa
1993); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Ky.
1994); Hoerner v. ANCO Insulations, Inc., 812 So.2d 45, 77 (La.
Ct. App. 2002); Denton v. Southern Railway Co., 854 S.W. 2d
885, 888-89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
4. Finally, there is nothing about the jury verdict in this case
to support the Chamber of Commerce’s suggestion (Br. 3) that
respondents’ asbestosis was merely a pretext for a damage
award almost exclusively based on fear of cancer. There is
instead every reason to presume the opposite. The trial
evidence established the serious impairments caused by
respondents’ asbestosis, ranging from their major physical
impact on daily life activities – walking short distances, talking,
In strikingly similar language and identical emphasis, the United
States asserts in this case that “the question is not whether damages for fear
of cancer may be recovered, but when.” U.S. Amicus Br. 5 (emphasis in
original). The answer to that question, however, is provided in the MetroNorth brief from which the question apparently originated: when “the
respondent does, in fact suffer a physical injury from exposure to
asbestos.” AIA Metro-North Br. 14.
13
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singing – to the sheer terror caused by being unable to breath
because of progressively worsening shortness of breath. See,
e.g., JA 114 (“shortness of breath” means “just can’t breath[e]”);
pp. 6-7, supra. No one testified, nor did their trial counsel argue
to the jury, that fear of cancer was the most significant of their
injuries. One respondent stated that his greatest source of
anxiety was not cancer but his worsening “shortness of breath”
by causing him to “clos[e] out more and more every day. * * *
The only thing I know is pray * * *.” JA 299.
Because, moreover, petitioner neither sought nor obtained a
special jury verdict that separated out the damages attributable
to fear of cancer from respondents’ other injuries, there is no
way of knowing whether any respondent received significant,
or even any, damages on that ground. Nor can petitioner now
fairly pierce the verdict and presume otherwise. A general jury
verdict on appellate review is entitled to a virtually irrebutable
presumption of regularity as to how the jury allocated damages
between a plaintiff’s various injuries. A defendant cannot
prevail on appeal by arguing that the jury might have awarded
all of the damages for one of a plaintiff’s injuries and none for
any of the others. Cf. Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 372 U.S.
108, 119 (1963) (“it is the duty of the courts to attempt to
harmonize the [jury] answers, if it is possible under a fair
reading of them”). In sum, even if, as petitioner argues, the
evidence did not support awarding large sums for respondents’
fear of cancer, there is no reason to presume that the jury did so.
C. None Of Petitioner’s Various Arguments Is Relevant To
The Question Whether A Railroad Employee Suffering
From Asbestosis May Recover Under FELA For Fear of
Cancer Based On Such Asbestosis
Petitioner and its amici dedicate volumes to legal issues not
presented by the facts and procedural posture of this case. They
contend that a plaintiff should not be able to maintain a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the
emotional distress is sufficiently “severe” to be corroborated by
“physical manifestations.” They argue, more particularly, that
such emotional distress claims based on fear of cancer should be
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subject to especially rigorous scrutiny because of the
background risks of cancer everyone faces. And petitioners and
its amici contend that the nation faces an asbestos litigation
“crisis” that warrants the judiciary’s guarding against any
expansion of tort remedies to those with apprehensions of
future physical injuries. See, e.g., Pet. Br. 16-31.
The short answer to all these contentions is that unlike the
railroad employees in Metro-North, respondents here are not
maintaining a stand-alone claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. They were not merely exposed to asbestos;
they were not mere bystanders to the physical injury of others;
and they are not complaining of some incidental, trivial physical
impact with only a tangential relationship to their principal
injury. Respondents are not physically unimpaired plaintiffs.
Consistent with the trial judge’s instructions (JA 573),
respondents are instead claiming the right to recover damages
for mental injuries as an element of damages for a tort otherwise
established that caused physical injury.
Petitioner’s basic error lies in its confusing two distinct legal
categories for the recovery of mental injuries: (1) Where mental
injuries are simply an additional aspect of damages for a tort
cause of action otherwise established (sometimes referred to as
“parasitic” damages); and (2) Where no physical injury
occurred and the mental injuries themselves purport to satisfy
the injury element necessary to establish the prima facie case
necessary for tort recovery. See generally William L. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts 213 (1941); Thomas A. Street, I The
Foundations of Legal Liability – Theory and Principles of Tort, 460
(1906); Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch. 2, Intro. Note, p. 23;
id. at § 924(a) & comment (a). This case implicates the first legal
category. Because, moreover, all of the legal authorities and
policy arguments vigorously asserted by petitioner and its amici
presuppose application of the second category, they are erected
on a foundational mischaracterization of the case at hand. And,
like a house of cards, petitioner’s entire argument utterly
collapses upon removal of that single, fictional card.
1. Petitioner devotes most of its brief (Br. 16-31) to the
proposition that the common law requires physical
manifestations of severe mental injury. The legal precedent and
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authorities upon which petitioner principally relies, however,
are all cases in which the petitioner is maintaining a stand-alone
claim for recovery of emotional distress either intentionally or
negligently inflicted. Many are bystander cases. None is
relevant to this case.14
We do not deny that for stand-alone emotional distress claims
there is precedent providing that the mental injury element
necessary for liability must be “severe” and sometimes even
established by physical manifestations.15 This precedent
includes claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress for
persons not physically impacted or injured but only a bystander
Jones v. CSX Transportation, 287 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) is completely
out of step with both traditional tort law and the vast majority of judicial
rulings addressing whether victims of asbestosis can also recover for their
reasonable fear of cancer. The court erred by completely rejecting the
longstanding and established distinction between stand-alone claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and recovery of damages for
mental injury “simply as an element of damages in an ordinary negligence
action.” Id. at 1348.
14

The result in this case, however, would not change even if, contrary
to our submission, the relationship of respondents’ mental injury to their
physical injury (asbestosis) was not deemed sufficient to make this a
parasitic damages claim. Although some courts imposed additional limits
on the recovery of mental injury when they expanded recovery to
plaintiffs in the “zone of danger” but lacking physical impact and injury,
those precedents do not intimate an intention simultaneously to contract
recovery where, as here, such an impact and injury are both present. As
this Court has itself noted, moreover, the precedent is not nearly as onesided as petitioner suggests, and not all jurisdictions are so insistent on
such proof of physical manifestations even for stand-alone claims of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Gottschall, 512 U.S. at 549
n.11; see, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1981);
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916 (1980); Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398 (1974); Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, Inc.,
444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Versland v. Caron Transport, 206 Mont. 313
(1983); Burd v. Sinn, 486 Pa. 146 (1979). In all events, whether formally
recovered as “parasitic” damages or on the basis of a “stand-alone” tort,
the policy reasons for imposing the physical manifestation requirement
(the only issue raised by the question presented) on mental injury are not
present in this case where respondents are suffering from asbestosis.
15
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within the “zone of danger.” But no comparable substantial
precedent exists for instances where the plaintiff is not seeking
recovery of mental injury on a stand-alone basis for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Quite the opposite is true. The
reasons for requiring greater degrees of proof for stand-alone
claims for mental injury are simply not present, which is why it
would be “absurd[ to] apply[] the bystander rule to a case
where the direct victim is seeking recovery for emotional
distress which is reasonably related to a physical injury.”
McAdams v. Eli Lilly, 638 F.Supp. 1173, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
As described by this Court in Metro-North, the common law
“does not examine the genuineness of emotional harm case by
case.” 521 U.S. at 436. There is consequently no rule of tort law
generally applicable to mental injuries that makes such injuries
recoverable only if they are “severe” and are “physically
manifested.” Courts have instead decided that whether a form
of “emotional distress” is recoverable should turn on whether
“the distress falls within specific categories.” Id. at 429. The
limitations that apply to the recovery of mental injuries vary
widely between categories.16 What is entirely absent from tort
law’s categorical approach is any support for petitioner’s claim
that there are universally applicable requirements that mental
injuries, including emotional distress, are recoverable only if
they are severe and physically manifested.
Even more significantly, the Metro-North Court expressly
identified respondents’ circumstances as one such “category” of
For some of those categories, there are courts that require that the
mental injury be severe, such as for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in general (see Restatement (Second) Torts, § 46), and some even
further require that the emotional distress result in “bodily harm” (id. § 46
(2)(b) (where tortious conduct directed at third party who is not a member
of the plaintiff’s immediate family)). But such categorical rules are
context-specific and without general applicability. For example, false
imprisonment (id. § 35), assault (§ 21), or offensive battery (§ 18) are all
torts where, unlike this case, the mental injury provides the injury element
necessary to establish the tort in the first instance, but no such severity or
physical manifestations requirement applies to any of those torts. See, e.g.,
id. § 21 comment c (“It is not necessary that [the assault] should directly
or indirectly cause any tangible and material harm”).
16
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plaintiffs that is entitled to recovery for mental injury: “that
category of plaintiffs who suffer from a disease” caused by the
defendant’s negligent conduct. 521 U.S. at 436. The reasons the
Court offered for that categorical rule are those which justify
full recovery where, as in this case, the plaintiff has otherwise
established his tort based on physical injury and merely seeks
to recover for “related” mental injury (id.) as “parasitic
damages”: “a desire to make a physically injured victim whole
or because the parties are likely to be in court in any event” (id.
at 436-37). Because of their asbestosis, respondents are just
those “physically injured victim[s]” who will “be in court in any
event” and are therefore entitled to be made “whole” for all
their injuries caused by petitioner’s negligence.
Tort law’s categorical approach to the recovery of mental
injuries is also why petitioner is mistaken in relying (Br. 28-30)
on any of the “general policy reasons” previously identified by
this Court for why courts have restricted recovery of mental
injury. See Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 433. The very reason for
the categorical approach is to address those policy concerns by
substantially limiting the number of potentially valid plaintiffs.
Hence, where, as in this case, the plaintiff fits in a traditional
tort category because he is suffering from a physical disease, the
category has itself already “separat[ed] valid, important claims
from those that are invalid or ‘trivial.’” Id. Likewise dissipated
by the categorical bounds is the “threat of ‘unlimited and
unpredictable liability,’” or “the ‘potential for a flood’ or
comparatively unimportant, or ‘trivial,’ claims.” Id.
It is especially noteworthy in this respect that the categorical
requirement that a plaintiff suffers from a physical disease such
as “asbestosis” does in fact dramatically limit the number of
potential plaintiffs who can maintain a valid cause of action. At
trial, it was established that only a small percentage of those
exposed to asbestos suffer from the intensity of lung scarring
and pulmonary impairment necessary for a diagnosis of
asbestosis. JA 95-96, 211.17 Petitioner in this case is consequently
Petitioner acknowledges this essential fact, but fails to account for its
significance. See Br. 22 n.16 , quoting In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases,
734 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990) ( “‘of those exposed to asbestos,
17
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hard pressed to claim that allowing asbestosis plaintiffs to
recover for all their injuries according to traditional tort law will
unduly open the litigation floodgates.
2. Equally lacking in merit is petitioner’s assertion (Br. 21-25)
that fear of cancer is per se unreasonable. According to
petitioner, such “knowledge-based fears” are too “inherently
subjective” and, “[e]specially when measured against the high
background risks every individual faces, * * * not the kind of
information that reasonably causes severe emotional injury to
the normally constituted person.” Id. at 12, 21-22, 24.
Petitioner’s error is two-fold. First, petitioner’s argument is
premised on the same false notion that infects its entire brief,
which is that the mental injury must be “severe” to warrant
recovery.
As previously described, no such severity
requirement generally applies where, as here, the plaintiffs are
not asserting a stand-alone claim for mental injury.
Petitioner’s second error, however, is even more fundamental.
Stripped of its exaggerated rhetoric, petitioner’s attack on what
it dubs “knowledge-based fears” is little more than a thinlyguised effort to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
Because any fear is necessarily based on personal “knowledge,”
petitioner’s indictment must be that the information upon
which respondents’ fear was based in this case was insufficient
to sustain any jury award. Petitioner supports its argument by
citing to a series of miscellaneous articles (Br. 22-24 & nn.17-21)
that discuss asbestos exposure (not asbestosis) and
mesothelioma or lung cancer.
We could easily respond to this argument by lengthy
discussion of substantial competing scientific authority
concerned with asbestosis and not just asbestos exposure,18 but
only a small percentage suffer from asbestos-related physical
impairment.’”). During the Metro-North oral argument, the railroad
counsel was similarly clear, advising the Court that “it is undisputed that
the overwhelming majority of exposure-only plaintiffs will never develop
asbestos-related injuries.” Metro-North Oral Arg. Trans. 14-15.
E.g., Churg & Green, Pathology of Occupational Lung Disease, supra;
Browne, Is Asbestos or Asbestosis the Cause of the Increased Risk of Lung
Cancer in Asbestos Workers?, supra.
18
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the proper course is instead to rely on the factual record actually
produced in the trial court. As previously described, that trial
evidence, which included the introduction of scientific studies
subject to cross examination, was more than sufficient to
establish the reasonableness of respondents’ fear of cancer
based on asbestosis. See pp. 3-4, 7, supra. A reasonable person
would not have to view a 10 percent risk of mesothelioma, or a
39 percent risk of fatal lung cancer for smokers as “trivial,”
“small,” or “incremental. “ Pet. Br. 25, 30.
What petitioner plainly cannot now do is either introduce new
evidence or invite this Court to reweigh the evidence. Petitioner
had ample opportunity at trial to introduce evidence that an
asbestosis victim cannot reasonably apprehend cancer.
Petitioner cannot now supplement the trial record without
improperly invading the jury’s factfinding responsibilities and
the supervisory authority of the trial judge. “Courts are not free
to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely
because the jury could have drawn different inferences or
conclusions * * *.” Tennant v. Peoria & P.U.R. Co., 321 U.S. 29,
35 (1944). Nor is it a fair objection “to say that the jury’s verdict
involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in
dispute * * * a measure of speculation and conjecture is required
on the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute.”
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946). This Court,
moreover, has long made especially clear the impropriety of
challenges to the amount of jury awards in FELA cases.19
For instance, the Court in St. Louis I. M. & S.R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S.
648, 661 (1915) readily dismissed a claim “that the award of $5,000 as
damages for pain and suffering” was “excessive.” While acknowledging
that “[t]he award does seem large,” the Court ruled that “the power, and
with it the duty and responsibility, of dealing with this matter rested upon
the courts below. It involves only a question of fact and is not open to
reconsideration here.” Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner’s implicit
challenge to the amount of the jury award in this case is even thinner. The
railroad defendant in Craft at least knew that the plaintiff had been
awarded a substantial sum: $5,000 in 1915. Notwithstanding its reference
(Br. 2, 6) to “staggering recoveries” and “massive verdicts,” petitioner can
make no such comparable claim with regard to the jury’s assessment of
damages for respondents’ fear of cancer. Here, the record does not reveal
19
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3. Finally, petitioner’s assertion that respondents should be
denied any recovery for their reasonable fear of cancer because
the nation faces an asbestos litigation “crisis” is no more
persuasive. As described in the very documents upon which
petitioner relies, those who claim that a crisis exists focus on the
litigation burden presented by thousands of lawsuits filed by
so-called “exposure only” plaintiffs -- those who have been
exposed to asbestos, but do not suffer from any physical disease
or impairment as a result. They contend that this litigation
threatens to overwhelm the courts and thereby deny judicial
relief to those deserving victims who are actually suffering from
a physical disease. They single out victims of asbestosis as
examples of those “clearly entitled to compensation.” See James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone
Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress,
and Medical Monitoring, reproduced in Pet. Lodging, p. 27.
Respondents, however, represent the very victims of asbestosis
– the “individuals who actually have asbestos-related illnesses”
– routinely acknowledged as legitimate plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Chamber of Commerce Amicus Br. 2.
The policy arguments advanced by petitioner and its amici are
further misdirected because neither this Court nor FELA is the
proper avenue for securing the law reform they seek. If current
tort law is incapable of addressing the claims brought by
thousands negligently exposed to asbestos, then it is for
Congress and state legislatures, and not this Court, to change
the applicable law.20 FELA would, in all events, be an especially
how much, if any, damages the jury awarded based on such fear.
Congress has, in fact, been considering legislative action to reform tort
law and related civil procedural matters for the past several years in
response to the challenges presented by mounting asbestos litigation. See,
e.g., S. 2546, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998, 105th Cong.
2d Sess. (1998); H.R. 1283, Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,
106th Cong. 1st Sess. (1999). Notably, in those legislative proceedings,
those supporting petitioner in this case freely admitted that legislative,
rather than judicial, action was the only legitimate avenue for addressing
the complex issues. See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999,
Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 1st
Sess. 320 (1999) (testimony of Conrad Mallet, Jr., Chairman, Coalition for
20
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inappropriate vehicle for the kind of tort reforms sought by
petitioner and its amici. Not only does FELA play only a
peripheral role in asbestos litigation, but as long emphasized by
this Court, FELA is a “broad remedial statute” and its statutory
language must be interpreted “‘liberally’ in light of its
humanitarian purposes.” Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Buell, 480
U.S. 557, 562 (1987); Metro-North, 521 U.S. at 429, quoting,
Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543. As described by the Court decades
ago in rejecting a similar effort to limit FELA’s deliberate
expansion of railroad employee recovery, “[i]n the face of the
legislative policy embodied in [FELA] * * * considerations of
public policy of the general kind relied upon * * * cannot be
permitted to encroach further upon the special policy expressed
by Congress in the Act.” Still v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 368 U.S.
35, 44-45 (1961).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY TO APPORTION
RESPONDENTS’ DAMAGES BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND ABSENT THIRD PARTIES

Petitioner argues that the trial judge should have instructed
the jury to apportion damages to various absent third parties
that petitioner alleges are partially responsible for respondents’
injuries. Petitioner’s initial argument (Br. 32-42) is that
apportionment was warranted because respondents’ injuries
were “divisible” based on causation. Petitioner’s alternative
proffer (Br. 42-47) is that even if causation does not provide a
basis for apportionment, the Court should now devise for FELA
a new, unspecified scheme of comparative fault for
Asbestos Reform) (“resolution of the [asbestos litigation] dilemma lies not
with the judiciary, but with Congress”); 145 Cong. Rec. S3510 (March 25,
1999) (statement of Senator John Ashcroft) (“Judges who make legal rules
out of whole cloth in the absence of constitutional or statutory text
damage the standing of the judiciary and our constitutional structure. * *
* [A] legislative solution to th[e asbestos] problem * * * provides the
proper incentives for courts to be restrained and reinforces the proper
roles of Congress and the Judiciary.”).
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apportionment. Both arguments should be rejected.21
A.

FELA Provides That A Railroad Employee Can
Recover In Full From The Railroad For Injuries
Caused “In Whole Or In Part” By The Railroad’s
Negligence

1. Contrary to petitioner’s submission (Br. 32-35), FELA’s
“simple and direct” language establishes a “relaxed standard of
causation” that compels rejection of petitioner’s proposed
“relaxed” apportionment standard. Coray v. Southern Pac. Co.,
335 U.S. 520, 524 (1949); Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543. FELA
unambiguously answers the question whether a railroad
employer is liable for an employee’s personal injuries for which
the railroad’s negligent conduct was only a partial cause.
According to the express terms of the statute, a railroad “shall
be liable in damages” to the injured employee “for such injury
or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence” of the
railroad. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (emphasis supplied). It is therefore well
settled that it is neither a complete nor a partial defense to an
employee’s lawsuit for complete recovery that the employee’s
injuries were “caused jointly by the fault of the carrier and third
persons.” See, e.g., Gaulden v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 654
P.2d 383, 391(D. Kan. 1983) (“bear all of the loss”).
This Court’s own decisions are fully in accord. In Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957), this Court
reversed a state court ruling that had construed FELA to impose
a test of causation under which the railroad defendant’s
negligence had to be “the sole, efficient, producing cause of
Petitioner’s apportionment arguments pertain at most only to
respondents Ayer and Butler because only for those two did petitioner
argue below that there was evidence of asbestos exposure at nonrailroad
workplaces. See JA 647; note 3, supra. Petitioner did not assert asbestos
manufacturers liability in its proposed jury instruction or verdict form and
declined to put on evidence as to their culpability. JA 539, 550-60; pp. 7-8,
supra. Petitioner’s oblique references (Br. 8, 49) to respondent Spangler’s
2 years of service on a Navy submarine fall far short of the minimum for
apportionment, no matter what the legal standard, given the lack of any
evidence concerning the extent or nature of his asbestos exposure there.
21

35
injury.” Emphasizing the “in whole or in part” language, the
Court held that causation is established when “the proofs justify
with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any
part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for
which damages are sought.” Id. (emphasis supplied). See, e.g.,
Sentilles v. Inter-Carribean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109
(1959); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 187 (1949).
To be sure, the Court in Rogers did not elaborate on the precise
scope of damages recoverable by an employee when the
railroad’s negligence “played any part” in causing the injury,
and there was also a contributing third party cause. 352 U.S. at
507. But there is no merit to petitioner’s suggestion that the
Rogers’ ruling does not bear on that question. The Rogers Court
described as “drastic” the employer’s duty to pay damages for
injury “due ‘in whole or in part’ to its negligence.” Id. The
Court characterized FELA as having “stripped [an employer] of
his common law defenses” to such a degree that “for practical
purposes the inquiry in these cases today rarely presents more
than the single question whether the negligence of the employer
played any part, however small, in the injury * * *.” Id. at 507-08.
Finally, the Court deemed as wholly “irrelevant” “whether the
immediate reason” for the injury was “some cause not
identified by the evidence.” Id. at 503.
Hence, in Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947), the
Court similarly described as “irrelevant” even “[t]hat the
foreseeable danger was from intentional or criminal
misconduct.” The railroad “nonetheless had a duty to make
reasonable provision against it” and “[b]reach of that duty
would be negligence.” Id. Rejecting the railroad’s defense, the
Court held that “we cannot say as a matter of law that
petitioner’s injury did not result at least in part from such
negligence.” Id.
Under petitioner’s view by contrast, apportionment would be
required whenever an injury is “caused by successive
independent causes” (Br. 32) and the existence of a contributing
cause would be highly “relevant” whether intentional, criminal,
negligent, or even nonnegligent in nature. FELA litigation
would regularly rather than “rarely” present more than the
“single question” whether the employer’s negligence played
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“any part.” FELA litigation would become encumbered by the
far more complex, nonbinary inquiry of the precise percentage
of the employer’s causal contribution to the injury. In short,
injected into FELA would be the very kind of limitation on
liability that Congress intended to eliminate by rejecting the
assumption of risk and fellow servant rule defenses and by
making employers liable for injuries they caused “in part.”
Finally, petitioner’s radical reading of FELA is contradicted by
the virtual absence in almost a century of FELA litigation of any
indication in either the judicial precedent or the litigation
practices of railroads that a railroad’s liability to a plaintiff must
be reduced in inverse proportion to its causal contribution. Not
once in this Court’s many decisions reaffirming the specialized
and liberal nature of FELA’s “in whole or in part” causation
language has the Court even hinted at the existence of such a
major limitation on defendant liability. Instead, the federal and
state reporters are replete with contribution cases brought by
FELA defendants under state law. See Annot., Right of Railroad
Charged with Liability for Injury to or Death of Employee Under
Federal Employer’s Liability Act, to Claim Indemnity or Contribution
from Other Tortfeasors, 19 A.L.R. 3d 928 (1968).22 Those cases
arose because those railroad defendants were entirely liable
See, e.g., Mills v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 276 F.3d 222, 222 (6th Cir.
2002); Gaines v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 23 F.3d 1170, 1171 (7th Cir. 1994);
Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349, 353-54 (9th Cir. 1989); Ala. Great. S.
R.R. v. Chi. & Northwestern Ry., 493 F.2d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 1974);
Kennedy v. Penn. R. Co., 282 F.2d 705, 710 (3d Cir. 1960); Southern R. Co.
v. Foote Mineral Co., 384 F.2d 224, 226 (6th Cir. 1967); Fort Worth &
Denver Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1955); Patterson v.
Penn. R. Co., 197 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1952); Stephens v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 991 F. Supp. 618, 620 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Tucker v. Reading Co., 335 F.
Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Reynolds v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 F.
Supp. 1141, 1142-43 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Spielman v. New York, New Haven
& Hartford R. Co., 147 F. Supp. 451, 453-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); Engvall v. Soo
Line R., 632 N.W.2d 560, 569 (Minn. 2001); Freeman v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
Inc., 714 So.2d 832, 835 (La. App. 1998); Walter v. Dow Chem. Co., 195
N.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Mich. App. 1972); Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. v. Arthur
Dixon Transfer Co., 98 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (Ill. App. 1951); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Prot. Co. 143 So. 316, 317 (Fla. 1932).
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under FELA and sought to recover part of the damages by suing
a third party that jointly caused the injuries.23
2. Petitioner and its amici seek to overcome FELA’s plain
meaning by relying on two other statutory clauses that they
contend mandate apportionment of damages between joint
causes. Petitioner’s reliance on both clauses is misguided.
a. According to petitioner (Br. 32-33 n.26) and amicus
Coalition for Asbestos Justice (Br. 24-27) FELA’s adoption of
comparative fault for plaintiff’s negligence (45 U.S.C. § 53)
demonstrates congressional intent in favor of apportionment in
this case. Rather than support petitioner’s view, however, this
Court has previously made clear that the fact that Congress took
such an explicit step reinforces the opposing view that Congress
intended no similar reduction in plaintiff recovery on account
of the joint liability of nonrailroad third parties. While 45 U.S.C.
§ 53 provides that when the employee’s own negligence causes
his injury, “the damages shall be diminished by the jury in
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such
employee,” no comparable provision exists with regard to third
party causes. As this Court pointedly explained in Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 268 n.23 (1979),
“[i]t would be particularly curious for Congress to refer
expressly to the established principle of comparative
negligence, yet say not a word about adopting a new rule limiting
the liability of the [defendant] on the basis of the nonparty
employer’s negligence” (emphasis supplied). Hence, both the
“in part” causation standard and comparative negligence
standard set forth in 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 53 affirmatively reinforce
the full scope of railroad liability.
Nor is there any merit to the suggestion of petitioner and its
Petitioner properly relegates to a footnote (Br. 33 n.26) Dale v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.Co., 552 A.2d 1037, 1041 (Pa. 1989), which served as the
centerpiece of its petition (pp. 20-21) and reply (pp. 6-7). The Dale court
found “implicit” in FELA a reduction in damages for third party causes,
somehow based on FELA’s treatment of contributory negligence and the
Rogers decision. 552 A.2d at 1041. We think that the reasoning of the Dale
dissenters (id. at 1043-44 (Papadakos, J., joined by Larsen, JJ), which is
consistent with the overwhelming precedent, is more persuasive.
23
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amicus that FELA’s imposition of complete liability on a
railroad is inconsistent with FELA’s adoption of comparative
fault for plaintiff’s negligence. FELA adopted a comparative
fault approach in order to expand an employee’s ability to
recover by eliminating the contributory negligence defense that
otherwise would have barred recovery altogether. Petitioner’s
proffered apportionment standard, by contrast, would limit
employee recovery by placing the burden on the employee,
rather than on the railroad employer, to establish the liability of
other third parties and to assume the risk that those other third
parties are judgment proof. Indeed, because petitioner contends
that its liability must be reduced if there are other contributing
nonnegligent causes (Br. 36), unlike even the rule for comparative
fault, petitioner’s unprecedented theory of limited defendant
liability would virtually guarantee that plaintiffs would be
denied full recovery for their injuries.
Accordingly, because comparative fault and joint and several
liability were both intended to expand employee recovery, they
reinforce rather than oppose each other. It is therefore not at all
surprising that many federal and state liability schemes
combine the two approaches, thereby directly contradicting
petitioner’s claim of their fundamental incompatibility. See
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994);
Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260-61 & n.7; Coats v. Penrod Drilling
Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1123, 1129 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Dobbs,
supra, at 1086 & n.2; Jerome H. Nates, Damages in Tort Actions,
§ 48.03[6] (1993 & 1997 Supp.).
b. Equally without merit is petitioner’s claim (Br. 32) that
FELA “makes clear that railroads are not liable for employee
injuries that result from outside causes” because 45 U.S.C. § 51
provides that railroads are liable only “to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier.” The single word
“while” has no bearing on the joint causation issue.
First, petitioner’s unfortunate phrasing “result from outside
causes,” obscures the vital distinction between (1) the scope of
railroad liability for injuries that result exclusively from
“outside” or nonrailroad causes; and (2) the scope of railroad
liability for injuries that result from a combination of railroad
and “outside” causes. Under the first scenario, the railroad is
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plainly not liable. A railroad must be a legal cause of the injury
to be liable. But the apportionment question raised in this case
concerns only the second scenario, and it is equally plain that
the “while he is employed” language upon which petitioner
relies does not remotely address the distinct circumstance of
joint causation. The more natural, and historically accurate,
reading of the language is simply that it ensures that FELA’s
remedial scheme would be available to persons injured in the
course of their employment with an interstate common carrier.24
Second, the statutory reference to “while” would have, in any
event, been an especially inapt means of addressing the joint
causation issue. Multiple-tortfeasor situations typically occur
when the employee’s injuries are caused by more or less
simultaneous and concurrent railroad and nonrailroad causes.
See, e.g., Rogers, supra. The statutory language “while he is
employed” offers no more guidance as to whether damages
should be apportioned in that circumstance than it does if the
multiple causes are not concurrent. If, moreover, petitioner is
suggesting that the word “while” means that an employee is
entirely barred from recovering for diseases traceable to railroad
conduct, but which remain latent until long after employment
has ended, this Court has already rejected such a crabbed view
of FELA’s remedial scope. See Urie, 337 U.S. at 187 (“We do not
think the mere difference in the time required for different acts
of negligence to take effect and disclose their harmful, disabling
consequences would justify excluding the one type of injury
from the Act’s coverage.”).

Congress added “while he is employed” in two provisions when it
reenacted FELA in 1908 in order to address the constitutional concerns
this Court raised in striking down FELA’s predecessor law, by ensuring
that the regulated activities had sufficient nexus to interstate commerce.
See 35 Stat. 65 (1908); 34 Stat. 232 (1906); 42 Cong. Rec. 4526-27 (1908) (Sen.
Dolliver); The Employer’s Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 504 (1908).
24
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B. Traditional And Settled Common Law Liability Rules
Also Support The Trial Judge’s Refusal To Instruct The
Jury To Apportion Damages In This Case Between The
Railroad And Absent Third Parties
The trial judge’s refusals to give petitioner’s proposed
apportionment instruction and special verdict forms to the jury
are also consistent with the common law liability rules
applicable under FELA. Petitioner misstates the role of
apportionment under both traditional and evolving common
law principles, which provide for the possibility of
apportionment only in circumstances far narrower than
petitioner suggests and not for the kind of indivisible injuries
suffered by respondents.
1. To avoid FELA’s plain meaning, petitioner alternatively
claims (Br. 35-39) that FELA silently incorporated a common
law rule allegedly prevalent in 1908 mandating apportionment
of damages in multiple-cause cases. Not only would such a rule
fail to overcome FELA’s language and remedial purposes
(Sinkler v. Missouri P.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 329 (1958); Rogers,
352 U.S. at 508), but petitioner’s exaggerated account of the
common law at the time of FELA’s enactment is wrong. It is
simply not true that “[s]everal liability was not only the general
rule, but the overwhelming rule.” Pet. Br. 35.
FELA’s common law liability scheme was expressly modeled
upon the “liberal interpretations * * * that now prevail in the
admiralty courts of the United States”(42 Cong. Rec. 4536 (1908)
(introductory statement of Senator Dolliver)), which in 1908
firmly embraced joint and several liability. See Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-155 (2d ed. 1994).
As described by the Court in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93
U.S. 302 (1876), in which two vessels negligently collided and
caused the sinking of a third vessel owned by the plaintiff,
“[n]othing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, having
suffered such a loss, to sue in a common-law action all the
wrong-doers, or any one of them * * * and it is equally clear,
that, * * * he is entitled to judgment in either case for the full amount
of his loss.” Id. at 315 (emphasis supplied), citing Murray v.
Lovejoy, 3 Wall. 19 (1863); Smith v. Hines, 2 Sumn. 348 (Me.
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1836). Nor was the then-prevailing admiralty rule out of step
with common law at the time. The admiralty rule favoring
joint and several liability was “in accord with the common law”
in “allow[ing] an injured party to sue a tortfeasor for the full
amount of damages for an indivisible injury that the tortfeasor’s
negligence was a substantial factor in causing * * *.” Edmonds,
443 U.S. at 260-61 & n.7. See Pet. 22 (describing joint and
several liability as “the traditional rule”).
Unlike petitioner, we are willing to acknowledge that there
was “considerable difference of opinion” in 1908 concerning the
precise scope of joint and several liability.25 Universal
consensus, however, is not required for the application of such
a standard under FELA both because joint and several liability
then reflected the clear majority view and because it is the view
consistent with FELA’s remedial purposes and plain language.
The 1906 edition of Judge Cooley’s celebrated treatise on torts
surveyed the case law and concluded that, notwithstanding
“considerable difference in opinion,” the “weight of authority”
supported application of joint and several liability “where the
negligences of two or more persons concur in producing a
single, indivisible injury” even in the absence of any “common
Because scholars in 1906 found it impossible to “harmonize all the
authorities” (T. Cooley, Treatise on the Law of Torts, 246 (3d ed. 1906)),
petitioner can find some early cases that press for a strict rule of causal
apportionment in multiple tortfeasor cases. But petitioner cannot
possibly maintain its claim that several liability was so
“overwhelming[ly]” the rule (Br. 35) that Congress must be deemed, sub
silentio, to have adopted it. At least one of petitioner’s citations, sampled
because of its illustrious author, is even wholly inapposite. Justice
Holmes’ opinion for the court in Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell, 21 N.E. 872,
873 (Mass. 1889), arose from a bill of equity to abate a nuisance caused by
two polluters and hence says little about the availability of joint liability
in damages actions at common law. In 1902, the same court applied joint
and several liability to independent tortfeasors who caused a single
personal injury. See Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902). Because,
moreover, some of those courts’ preference for several liability was based
on restrictions on contribution among joint tortfeasors long since
abandoned, those rulings provide an especially poor historical basis for
petitioner’s arguments. See Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 52 (5th ed. 1984).
25
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duty, common design or concert[ed] action.” T. Cooley, Treatise
on the Law of Torts, 247 (3d ed. 1906); Dobbs, supra, § 390 (same).
There can be no question, moreover, regarding what standard
of liability is more in harmony with FELA, even if FELA’s
statutory language did not already plainly impose entire
liability on railroads whose negligence was at least a “part[ial]”
cause of the employee’s injury. A “progressive rule of liability
that [i]s less restrictive * * * [is] more consistent with * * * FELA’s
broad remedial goals.” Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555 (adopting zone
of danger test).
2. Petitioner’s claim that the common law has since evolved
away from joint and several liability for the kind of indivisible
injuries suffered by respondents in favor of apportionment is no
more persuasive. Both the First and Second Restatement of Torts
confirm the pedigree and contemporary acceptance of joint and
several liability for indivisible injury.
Section 879 of the First Restatement (1939) provides that “each
of two persons who is independently guilty of tortious conduct
which is a substantial factor in causing a harm to another is
liable for the entire harm, in the absence of a superseding
cause.” The commentary explains that “[a] person whose
tortious conduct is otherwise one of the legal causes of an
injurious result is not relieved from liability for the entire harm
by the fact that the tortious act of another responsible person
contributes to the result.” Id. § 879 comment a.
The Second Restatement of Torts, published in 1965 and 1979, is
entirely in accord. Section 875 provides that “[e]ach of two or
more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single
and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to
the injured party for the entire harm.” The Second Restatement
also makes clear that the kind of injuries being suffered by
respondents in this case constitute the paradigmatic example of
the kind of “indivisible harm” for which joint and several
liability rather than apportionment applies. Respondents suffer
from a physical disease, asbestosis, and from a variety of
physical and mental impairments resulting from that disease.
The Second Restatement commentary explains that, “[c]ertain
kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of
any logical, reasonable, or practical division” and offers as
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examples of such “indivisible” harms “death” and “any single
wound,” which fairly describes the impact of asbestosis upon
the lung. Id. § 433A comment i (“By far the greater number of
personal injuries * * * are thus normally single and indivisible.”).
Relevant Restatement provisions also specifically reject
petitioner’s claim (Br. 36) that the common law distinguished
between joint causation caused by successive and simultaneous
torts of independent actors. According to the First Restatement,
there is liability for the entire harm “where both are
simultaneously negligent * * * and also where the act of one
either occurs or takes harmful effect after that of the other.”§
879 comment a. The Second Restatement even more directly
refutes petitioner’s claim. Section 879 provides that where joint
and several liability is otherwise applicable, “each is subject to
liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their
conduct is concurring or consecutive.”
3. Contrary to petitioner’s claim (Br. 40-42), Section 433A of
the Second Restatement does not support petitioner’s view that
the common law rule provides for apportionment in the kind of
factual circumstances presented by this case. Section 433A
provides for apportionment between multiple causes only for
“divisible” injuries, which are present only if either “there are
distinct harms” or “there is a reasonable basis for determining
the contribution of each cause to a single harm.” Respondents,
however, are not suffering from distinct harms, as are
presented, for instance, when a victim is suffering from a
broken leg caused by one action and a broken arm caused by
another. Nor are they suffering from the kind of single harm for
which there could remotely exist a “reasonable basis” for
determining the causal contribution. Instead, as previously
described, their injuries arise from their asbestosis, which is
quintessentially an “indivisible” personal injury under
longstanding and contemporary tort law principles. See, e.g.,
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 109496 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestosis as indivisible injury); Owens
Corning Fiberglass v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467, 476-77 (Ky. 2001)
(same). The accompanying Second Restatement commentary
specifically explains that “indivisible” injury is not subject to
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apportionment and contrasts “personal injury,” which is
generally indivisible, from injury to real property in nuisance
law, which is more susceptible to being considered divisible.
Second Restatement § 433A comments d & i; see First
Restatement § 881 (apportionment for nuisance).26
Petitioner’s reliance on common law apportionment rules is,
in all events, misguided because the burden is on the party
seeking to “apportion” damages based on causation to establish
that a reasonable basis of apportionment exists and therefore
that the injury at issue is in fact divisible.27 At trial, however,
petitioner introduced hardly any evidence on the question,
despite multiple opportunities. Petitioner’s effort to construct
a basis for apportionment for the first time now, based
exclusively on sketchy testimony, is too little, too late.
The beginning and end of the evidentiary basis for petitioner’s
current claim that an apportionment instruction should have
been given was testimony by respondents’ witnesses that two
of the respondents (Butler and Ayers) may have been exposed
to asbestos in nonrailroad employment.28 When respondents’
This longstanding judicial distinction between real property and
personal injury in applying joint and several liability is also why
petitioner is mistaken (Br. 38-39, 49) in relying on nuisance, trespass, and
polluted stream cases as “analogous” to “pollution of a lung by asbestos,
and the resulting asbestosis” (id. at 49).
26

See Second Restatement § 433B(2) (“Where the tortious conduct of
two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and
one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the
harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to
the apportionment is upon each such actor.”); Third Restatement § 26
comment h (“Whether damages are divisible is a question of fact. A party
alleging that damages are divisible has the burden to prove that they are
divisible.”); Dobbs, supra, § 174; Second Restatement App. §§174-423, at
pp. 271-302 (1995) (listing cases); Tracy v. Cottrell, 206 W.Va. 363 (1999).
27

The trial judge during voir dire specifically asked petitioner’s counsel
whether they intended to put on evidence regarding negligence and
causation of third parties. JA 69-70. In the ensuing colloquy, the only third
parties counsel mentioned were asbestos manufacturers. Petitioner’s
counsel at first denied any intent to introduce evidence regarding the
manufacturers, but then suggested that they might. Id. But, in all events,
28
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medical expert was asked on direct examination about the
relative asbestos exposure to which Ayers had been subjected
in his railroad job as compared to his automotive maintenance
job, the doctor simply replied “Well, It’s hard for me to say. I’m
just going to say that they’re probably equivalent.” JA 205. On
direct examination, the same witness testified, in addressing the
relative exposure to which Butler was subjected in his three
months working in the locomotive engine repair shop as
compared to his thirty years as a pipefitter, that the railroad
employment was a “contributing cause” and the nonrailroad
employment was “a bigger contributor.” JA 195. On cross
examination, the witness refused to acquiesce in petitioner’s
counsel’s characterization of the exposure during railroad
employment as “very minimal” and instead said the role was
“minimal” but “I don’t know how much,” at which point
petitioner’s counsel declined to allow the witness to elaborate
any further. JA 236-37. In describing the contribution of
nonrailroad employment to Butler’s asbestos exposure,
petitioner’s own expert likewise acknowledged that because he
“didn’t take any measurements” at those locations, he could
conclude only that Butler had “ample opportunity for
exposure” at nonrailroad employment. “ JA 376. He further
conceded he could not even recall how one possible “model for
attributing causation in asbestos disease” might apply. JA 392.
Such evidence establishes at most that there may have been
other nonrailroad causes of the two respondents’ injuries. The
evidence does not remotely establish that their personal injury
is divisible based on causation. The paucity of evidence is no
doubt why the trial record is devoid of any argument by
petitioner, in support of his apportionment instruction, verdict
petitioner never introduced such evidence (see pp. 7-8 & note 6, supra) and
both its proposed jury instruction, verdict form, and new trial motion
referred exclusively to nonrailroad employment and made no mention of
manufacturers. JA 539, 550, 647-49. Thus, despite petitioner’s plea (Br.
50), it long ago forfeited its opportunity to base apportionment on
asbestos manufacturers.
Respondents’ settlements with some
manufacturers were also the basis of setoffs from the final award. See p.
9, supra.
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forms, or new trial motion, actually setting forth a “reasonable
basis” for apportionment. Petitioner made no argument
because a personal injury such as asbestosis, including the
physical and mental harms resulting from that physical disease,
is precisely the kind of classic “indivisible” injury appropriate
for joint and several liability and not subject to apportionment.
Nor can petitioner now, in any event, correct its lapses at trial.
The evidence must be read in the light most favorable to
respondents as the prevailing party and petitioner cannot
proffer possible bases for apportionment and new evidence.
Hence, while petitioner now suggests that damages might be
apportioned based on “volumetric evidence” (Br. 38, 49),
derived presumably from “the length of the plaintiff’s periods
of exposure, the quantity of asbestos contained in each product,
and the extent to which those products emitted asbestos fibers”
(Br. 42, 49), petitioner could have introduced such specific
evidence with regard to Butler or Ayers, but did not do so. No
reasonable basis for apportionment was ever proffered at trial.
Indeed, petitioner’s own brief undercuts its theory (Br. 49)
that the mere fact that Butler worked at one location for three
months and at other locations for a nonrailroad employer for 30
years creates a reasonable basis for apportionment. The causal
mechanics of asbestos exposure to asbestosis are hardly so
simple. As petitioner itself explains (Br. 3, 24), because the risks
created by asbestos exposure, including asbestosis are “doserelated,” they “vary significantly with fiber type” as well as
with “intensity and duration of asbestos exposure.” See id. at 24
& n.19 (“certain asbestos fibers are less hazardous”). While
there was evidence that the asbestos fibers at petitioner’s
employment were hazardous and that the exposure, especially
in the repair shop where Butler worked for three months
without any protection, was particularly intense (see note 3,
supra), petitioner failed to introduce any evidence of fiber type,
intensity or duration of actual exposure, presence or absence of
protective measures, or ventilation, at any nonrailroad
employment, let alone of the similarly absent “epidemiological
evidence” to which petitioner now elusively refers (Br. 49).29
29

OSHA regulations reflect the complexity of the causal mechanics
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In arguing that a more “relaxed” apportionment standard
should apply, petitioner also confuses the essential distinction
between apportionment principles that limit a plaintiff’s recovery
and contribution principles that do not limit a plaintiff’s recovery
but apply instead only in lawsuits between jointly responsible
defendants. Precisely because contribution does not affect the
plaintiff’s ability to recover in full for her injuries, the courts do
in contribution cases apply a dramatically reduced standard of
divisibility and are much more willing to engage in rough
speculation in allocating damages between various defendants.
United States v. Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 319 (6th Cir. 1998).
Petitioner nonetheless cites in support of relaxed
apportionment, which would deny plaintiff recovery, cases that
are contribution actions. For instance, in Moore v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1986), cited by petitioner (Br.
42), the court was merely allocating damages in contribution
between defendants. In direct conflict with petitioner’s
apportionment arguments here, the Moore court made clear that
each of the defendants was jointly and severally liable for the
plaintiff’s entire injury. Id. at 1063. We do not deny the
availability of contribution actions under FELA, and, as
previously noted, FELA defendants have routinely filed such
actions in the past. See p.36 & note 22, supra. But the availability
of contribution, which diminishes the harshness of joint and
several liability without doing violence to FELA’s purposes, is
a reason why apportionment is not available. It is not evidence
of judicial acceptance of a relaxed standard of apportionment.30
related to asbestos exposure and resulting disease. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1001 (exposure rate depends, inter alia, on fiber concentration, air
flow rate, and fiber size); 59 Fed. Reg. 40964, 40970, 40992 (1994)
(regulatory changes based on complexity).
Petitioner similarly mischaracterizes the import of lower court cases
arising under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.
Although courts have held that “apportionment is available” (Pet. Br. 44),
they have further held that pursuant to “traditional and evolving common
law principles” it is available only when the injury is divisible and not, as
in this case and virtually all CERCLA cases, where the injury is indivisible.
See, e.g., Chem Nuclear System v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 259-61 (D.C. Cir.
30
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4. Finally, FELA’s language, structure, and well-established
remedial purposes would compel rejection of any more relaxed
standard for apportionment pursuant to either petitioner’s
unsupported account of common law principles (Br. 42-43) or
its penultimate invitation (Br. 45-48) to this Court to adopt a
new fault-based standard of apportionment.
As previously described, FELA’s “simple and direct”
language leaves no doubt that Congress intended for joint and
several liability to apply where, as in this case, a railroad’s
negligence has been a partial cause of an indivisible injury. See
pp. 34-39, supra. Pursuant to the statute’s plain meaning, “[i]t
does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also with
reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result to other
causes * * *” or that “the immediate reason” for the injury was
“some cause not identified by the evidence.” Rogers, 352 U.S.
at 503, 506-07. For this reason, petitioner’s characterization of
how the common law should evolve to be more consistent with
petitioner’s “policy considerations” (Br. 45) is wholly beside the
point. Petitioner’s preferred policies cannot trump FELA’s. In
FELA, Congress “introduced a new policy and quite radically
changed the existing law” to further “humanitarian purposes”
2002); U.S. v. Hercules, 247 F.3d 706, 716-19 (8th Cir. 2001); Brighton, 153
F.3d at 317-18 (6th Cir.); O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-80 (1st Cir. 1989);
U.S. v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171-73 & n.23 (4th Cir. 1988); U.S. v. ChemDyne, 572 F.Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.Ohio. 1983). In determining, moreover,
when such indivisibility is present, the courts have uniformly rejected the
kind of unduly simplistic volumetric approximation that petitioner here
suggests (Br. 38, 49). See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172; Chem-Dyne, 572
F.Supp. at 811. In both U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722
(2d Cir. 1993) and U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270 (3d Cir.
1992) cited by petitioner (Br. 45), the courts did not apportion damages;
they simply concluded that a defendant was liable for no damages if it
was not a cause of the injury in the first instance. And, in In re Bell
Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1993), unlike in this case, the
source of the injury was the same facility operated by different defendants
and the defendant offered extensive, numerical evidence of the relative
contribution for each time period. See id. at 903-04; Hercules, 247 F.3d at
718 (“Evidence supporting divisibility must be concrete and specific.”)
(emphasis supplied); Chem Nuclear Sys., 292 F.3d at 261 (ruling “some
circumstantial evidence” insufficient for geographic divisibility).
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by “permit[ting] recovery, in cases where recovery could not be
had before, and tak[ing] from the defendant defenses which
formerly were available.” Winfree v. Northern P. R. Co., 227
U.S. 296, 302 (1913); Gottschall, 512 U.S. at 543.
Indeed, petitioner’s account of what the common law should
be or is becoming is both fictional and self-defeating. It is
simply not true either that “most States now apportion even
indivisible harms” or that joint and several liability has been
“long abandoned” Pet. Br. 42, 50. Joint and several liability for
indivisible harms clearly remains a dominant rule.
Most directly relevant to this case, joint and several liability
remains today the settled rule in admiralty cases (see
Schoenbaum, supra, § 514; Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 260-61)31 and
under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 688, which “adopts ‘the
entire judicially developed doctrine of liability’ under [FELA].”
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 456 (1994),
quoting Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439
(1958). Federal courts apply joint and several liability under
the Jones Act because, as this Court explained in Edmonds,
describing the policies favoring joint and several liability in
admiralty, otherwise “there will be many circumstances where
the [employee] will not be able to recover in any way the full
amount of the damages determined in his suit * * *.” 443 U.S. at
269; see Joia v. Jo-Ja Service Corp., 817 F.2d 908, 916-17 (1st Cir.
1983); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540,
1548 (11th Cir. 1987); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d
1113, 1134 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). Similar uniformity is
evident in federal hazardous waste law. Virtually every federal
court to address the issue has concluded in the past two decades
that “traditional and evolving common law principles”
mandate the application of joint and several liability for
indivisible injuries. See note 30, supra.
The Court’s treatment in McDermott of the impact of settlement on
defendant liability is similarly not inconsistent with the defendants’ joint
and several liability. In McDermott, the Court made clear that it was
addressing only the impact of settlement and not disputing the threshold
applicability of joint and several liability or otherwise disturbing its prior
endorsement of that standard in Edmonds. See 511 U.S. at 210 n.10.
31
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Nor does the Restatement (Third) of Torts (2000) compel a
contrary view. The Third Restatement itself “takes no position
on whether joint and several liability, several liability, or some
combination of the two should be adopted for independent
tortfeasors who cause an indivisible injury.” § 17 comment a.
The Restatement instead presents a varied list of five different
possible approaches that reflect the diversity of state legislative
efforts. Id. §§ A18-E21. The Restatement’s accompanying survey
further reveals that as of its writing 14 States and the District of
Columbia had retained joint and several liability substantially
unmodified and of the states adopting hybrid schemes, many
would apply joint and several liability in the circumstances of
this case, involving toxic substances and absent third parties.
Id. at § 17 comment a (pp. 149-59). Thus, approximately the
same number of jurisdictions embrace traditional joint and
several liability as did the “zone of danger” test characterized
by this Court as “well-established” in Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555.
But even the fact that some states have recently decided to
adopt more limited joint and several liability standards
undermines, rather than supports, petitioner’s case. Almost all
of these tort reform initiatives have resulted from the action of
state legislatures responding to the competing and complex
factors relevant to fashioning a liability standard. Whatever the
respective merits of the many, widely divergent hybrid schemes
emerging from that legislative process, they clearly reflect an
evolutionary process suited to legislative action. They do not
supply a precedential basis for judicial amendment of a
compensation system, like FELA, which is “an interface of
statutory and judge-made law,” because “[o]nce Congress has
relied upon conditions that the courts have created, [the Court
is] not as free as we would otherwise be to change them.”
Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 272-73.
CONCLUSION
The judgments of the circuit court should be affirmed or in the
alternative the petition for writ of certiorari should be dismissed
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as improvidently granted.32
Respectfully submitted.
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Were this Court not to affirm the judgments below in their entirety,
in no event would full reversal be warranted. On the first issue, only the
amount of damages would be at issue, and petitioner’s liability would not
need to be retried. On the second issue, only the judgments for Butler and
Ayers would be subject to remand because only for those two did
petitioner argue below that there was evidence of asbestos exposure at
nonrailroad employment that required an apportionment instruction.
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Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 (17RR-1)

A-1

Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 (17RR-2)

A-2

Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1

THE DIAGNOSIS OF NONMALIGNANT DISEASES
RELATED TO ASBESTOS
THIS OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN THORACIC SOCIETY WAS ADOPTED BY THE ATS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, MARCH 1986
Objective
The health effects of asbestos have become a cause of serious
concern in recent years. It has been estimated that from 1940 to
1979, in the United States alone, 27,500,000 individuals were
exposed to this mineral at work. Recognition of the diseases
caused by asbestos exposure has led manufacturers to reduce
exposure in a variety of ways, such as by using alternative
materials and by instituting improved work practices. It has also
led to wide-spread public concern over the presence of asbestos
in the environment, and fear on the part of persons with minimal
exposure. This and projections of future asbestos related illness
have posed important public policy questions -- whether to
remove all asbestos in public buildings and what to do about the
enormous estimated legal liability. In this context, physicians
are commonly asked for advice. Furthermore, they are also
consulted regarding the diagnosis of an asbestos-related
respiratory condition in an exposed individual. While abundant
literature exists on the health effects of asbestos, there is much
that is conflicting. Accordingly, this report has been prepared by
a group of experts to present an authoritative consensus view of
the current state of knowledge while pointing out areas where
additional information is necessary. An attempt is made to
summarize our present knowledge on the diagnosis of
nonmalignant asbestos-related pulmonary disease and provide
the sources on which the opinion is based.
A-3

Asbestos -- the Mineral
The generic term "asbestos" is used to describe a group of
minerals which, when crushed, break into fibers rather than dust.
They are hydrated fibrous silicates which have great tensile
strength, heat resistance, acid resistance, and some varieties are
also flexible. This weavable rock has numerous important uses
in an industrial society, and world production and use climbed
steadily since its commercial introduction in the late 19th
century. Geology, mineralogy, and uses have been well
described elsewhere (1,2). World production of asbestos has
dropped markedly since the mid 1970's. The cumulative
production of asbestos, however, continues to increase. There
has been a good deal of debate about the mineralogic definitions
of asbestos and asbestiform fibers. The most complete recent
discussion on trends in asbestos production and now widely
accepted mineralogic definitions are found in the NAS Report on
asbestiform fibers (3).
Asbestos in Lung Tissue
Inhaled asbestos that is retained in the lung can become coated
with a proteinaceous iron staining material. The resulting
asbestos or ferruginous body is a most characteristic index of
asbestos exposure. It is usually recognized by its beadednecklace or drumstick appearance. The longer fibers are more
likely to become coated (2-22). The core of asbestos, i.e., bodies
found in human lungs, is more likely to be an amphibole fiber
than to be chrysotile, perhaps due to the greater ability of the
former to survive in lung tissue, while chrysotile tends to
disappear over time. The majority of the lung burden of
asbestos, however, is uncoated and consists of short fibers, i.e.,
less than 5 microns (2-21). These are poorly visible or invisible
on light microscopy but have been demonstrated by phase
microscopy and electron microscopy. Asbestos bodies are
commonly found in small numbers in lungs of city dwellers at
routine autopsies in the absence of occupational exposure to
A-4

asbestos and asbestos related illness. These are usually few in
number and unassociated with pathologic abnormality in the
parenchyma. This observation emphasizes the importance of
developing standardized techniques to quantify the number and
type of asbestos fibers in lung tissue (to be discussed below).
Benign Pleural Abnormalities Associated with Asbestos
Asbestos causes pleural plaques, pleural thickening and pleural
effusion. Pleural plaques are discrete, elevated, opaque, shiny,
rounded lesions.
They characteristically occur on the
posterolateral aspect of the lower parietal pleura or diaphragm,
but usually not on the visceral pleura, at the costophrenic angles,
or at the apices. Thin plaques are smooth and grayish-white.
Thicker ones are ivory-colored or gray and may have either a
smooth surface or bosselated surface, or be coarsely nodular
with the consistency of cartilage. Plaques are of two types,
diffuse or nodular, and elevated. They can vary in size and
shape. On inspection of gross specimens, calcification may be
present but is not common. Microscopically, plaques are seen
to be laminated collagenous connective tissue, acellular, with
few inflammatory or fibrocytic nuclei; many are covered by a
thin layer of regular and well-differentiated mesothelial cells.
Capillaries are rare (23, 24). Elastic staining shows intact
lamellae beneath the plaque in continuity with the surrounding
normal parietal pleural connective tissue, suggesting that
plaques are extrapleural and develop between the latter and its
covering layer of mesothelial cells (23). On microscopic
examination, calcium deposition is present in a large proportion
of plaques, and occurs as deposits along with the course of the
collagen fibers, ceasing abruptly where the connective tissue
changes into normal pleural tissue (23). Well-differentiated
cuboidal mesothelial cells are present on the surface and the
edges of the plaque (23); metaplastic changes are uncommon
(24, 25).
Although coated asbestos fibers have not been reported in
A-5

relation to pleural plaques in the extensive series of 172 sections
examined by Meurman (23) using polarized light, the presence
of many uncoated fibers may be noted when ashed tissue is
studied (26, 27). Recent studies of the digestate of a small
number of plaques has demonstrated the presence of
submicroscopic fibers of both chrysotile and amosite fiber in
these structures. It is of interest that these are more concentrated
in the calcified zones than in the fibrous zones (28).
The usual effect of asbestos on the visceral pleura is a focal or
diffuse thickening. This varies from a thin, milky white
discoloration, detectable only on gross visualization to a thick
peel encasing the lung and easily seen on chest roentgenogram.
In contrast to plaques, which are frequently diagnosed
roentgenologically in asymptomatic persons, pleural fibrosis
may cause symptoms and impair pulmonary function.
Pleural effusion may be caused by inhalation of asbestos; this
is an early manifestation and is usually an exudate. On rare
occasions it may persist for months or years. It may recur on the
same or the opposite side after several years of exposure. In
unusual circumstances it may be bilateral. Macroscopically, the
fluid may be blood stained with variable numbers of
erythrocytes, macrophages, lymphocytes, and mesothelial cells
(29).
Pulmonary Asbestosis
Definition
The term asbestosis should be reserved for the interstitial
fibrosis of the pulmonary parenchyma in which asbestos bodies
or fibers may be demonstrated. While pleural abnormalities are
commonly associated with a parenchymal disease, they should
be separately classified as there are differences between pleural
and parenchymal fibrosis in epidemiology, clinical features, and
prognosis.
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Pathologic Features
In lungs with minimal or moderate fibrosis, the changes may be
subtle and difficult to demonstrate. On examination of gross
specimens, they appear as gray opaque areas devoid of air spaces
in an otherwise brown lung. The microscopic changes in
pulmonary asbestosis vary from small areas of basal fibrosis to
a diffuse, fine fibrosis of both lungs.
In general, the more extensive the process the smaller the
volume of the lungs. The cut surface of the lung has a dark
brown color with streaks of a fine, gray-colored fibrosis that
generally appears to affect subpleural areas first and, frequently,
in multiple and separate areas. This fibrosis may accentuate
lobar and lobular septa and extends projections into the lung
parenchyma. The parenchymal fibrosis, which has a linear and
reticular appearance by X-ray, affects the lower lobes first, and
extends upward with prolonged or heavy exposure (10, 30, 31).
The fibrosis may take one of three forms. One is a diffuse
fibrosis without air space enlargement; a second form is called
honeycombing. This form may affect the lower lobes and
subpleural regions (31). The third form is a combination of both
diffuse fibrosis and honeycombing. This latter form is the one
most frequently observed. The honeycombing is characterized
by enlarged thick-walled air spaces ranging in size from 1 to 15
mm (32). The pleural surface adjacent to the fibrosis is
invariably involved in the fibrotic process, either mildly with the
appearance of a milky covering to the fibrosis, or with
widespread fibrosis and symphysis (30, 31). The hilar lymph
nodes are only sightly enlarged and soft unless other disease
coexists. While emphysema has been reported in the past, it is
unusual, and may have been incorrectly labeled as
honeycombing (10, 33).
Microscopic Appearances
There is little information on the early pathophysiology of
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asbestosis in humans. Current opinion is largely based on
inferences from animal studies. Some evidence exists that
release of lysosomal enzymes may result from the partial
ingestion of the asbestos fibers and the incomplete fusions of the
phagosome membrane, so allowing the release of enzymes into
the medium from lyosomes which have fused with the
phagosome. The cytotoxic activity of asbestos exhibited by the
release of lysosomal enzymes may result from the fibers
penetrating intracellular structures, such as the nucleus and
lysosomes, by preventing the movement of organelles within the
cytoplasm, or by disrupting the cytoplasmic organization
provided by microfilaments and microtubules (34). In any case,
the initial reaction to asbestos fiber introduced into the lung is
the immediate exudation of neutrophils and macrophages into
the alveolar spaces in the locus of asbestos. This exudate varies
with the age of the lesion. In the initial stages the exudate may
be predominantly neutrophilic. Macrophages are the most
common cells in the infiltrate. The inflammatory infiltrate soon
is associated with varying degrees of organization with fibrosis
(35, 36). The process is believed to be concentrated initially in
peribronchiolar regions (10, 30). The initial lesion after
exposure by inhalation is in the region of the respiratory or
terminal bronchioles. There is a macrophage exudate in the
lumen associated with asbestos fibers and bodies. Metaplasia of
the cuboidal epithelium to squamous type may occur. In the
early states, fibrosis may be minimal but, when present, is in the
respiratory and terminal bronchiolar regions and in the alveoli
arising from the most proximal alveolar ducts. Alternatively,
there may be coboidalization of the epithelial cells.
Characteristically, in early stages only an occasional pulmonary
subunit is involved. More advanced cases show a diffuse
fibrosis, involving the interstitium, frequently associated with
areas of extensive fibrosis with obliteration of air spaces and
condensation of the bronchovascular structures. Areas adjacent
to the fibrosis may show accumulation of alveolar macrophages,
some of which have ingested asbestos fibers or other fragments.
Alveolar epithelial hyperplasia may also occur. When moderate
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or severe degrees of fibrosis are present, the small pulmonary
arteries and arterioles are thickened and sclerotic (30). (The
presence of uncoated asbestos fibers and asbestos bodies in the
presence of interstitial fibrosis is mandatory for the pathologic
diagnosis of asbestosis.)
Before a pathologic diagnosis of asbestosis can be made we must
consider a number of problems, including the following:
1.

There are numerous other causes of interstitial fibrosis.

2.

The distribution of interstitial fibrosis in asbestosis may be
irregular, and therefore, adequate sampling of the lung must
be done. The lingula and the right middle lobe are
particularly prone to nonspecific fibrosis and sampling must
take this into consideration.

3.

While advanced asbestosis characteristically shows
numerous asbestos bodies, they may not always be found
because many fibers are cleared from the lungs and some,
particularly chrysotile, may undergo dissolution and
fragmentation with time (32). Thus, in unusual cases it may
be difficult to demonstrate fibers or asbestos bodies in the
histologic preparation. When that is the case, 5 to 10
additional sections from the same block, and 5 to 10
additional new blocks from areas with fibrosis, should be
prepared, stained, and surveyed for asbestos bodies. If they
are not found, the diagnosis of asbestosis is unlikely.

4.

Even in the absence of a history of asbestos exposure, the
presence of several or more asbestos bodies in areas of
extensive interstitial fibrosis is sufficient evidence for a
morphologic diagnosis of asbestosis.

5.

Not everyone who inhales an asbestos fiber, or even a few
fibers, develops even microscopic asbestosis. Normal lung
defense mechanisms remove fibers via several wellA-9

described mechanisms.
The Pneumoconiosis Committee of the American College of
Pathologists and National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health dealt with these considerations when formulating the
following statement with which we concur:
"The criteria that permit the pathologist to establish the
diagnosis of asbestosis have evolved during a review of
many cases of the disease. Presently, the minimal features
that permit the diagnosis are the demonstration of discrete
foci of fibrosis in the walls of respiratory bronchioles
associated with accumulations of asbestos bodies. These
morphologic findings, although adequate to establish the
diagnosis of asbestosis in an early evolutionary stage, have
not been shown to result in functional and radiologic
alterations. The demonstration of asbestos bodies in the
absence of fibrosis is insufficient evidence to justify the
diagnosis of asbestosis. Conversely, a definite diagnosis of
asbestosis cannot be made by the pathologist in cases that
show characteristic fibrosis in the absence of asbestos bodies
or other evidence of fibers. Because asbestos bodies are
unevenly distributed in tissue, an adequate number of
samples should be examined thoroughly." (32)
They further state that although the demonstration of asbestos
fibers by the electron microscopic study of tissue digestates
provides evidence of exposure, ultrastructural technique alone
cannot be used to establish definitively the etiologic role of
asbestos in disease (32).
This Committee has published guidelines for methods of
assessing lung fiber concentration and pathologic grading of
asbestosis. The certainty of the cause and effect relationship of
asbestos to the fibrotic process increases with increasing
numbers of such particles and fibers visualized by light
microscopy. Electron microscopy of digested lung preparation
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from documented cases of asbestosis shows very large numbers
of uncoated fiber fragments (37).
Since asbestos bodies and fibers appear in lungs without
evidence of asbestos-related disease, the question arises as to
how many such bodies are necessary to infer a cause and effect
relationship between asbestos particles and fibrosis. No precise
answer exists, but efforts to quantify the numbers of asbestos
particles in known cases indicate that it is high. In the cases of
asbestos studied by Whitwell, the lungs nearly always showed
three million light visible fibers per gram; control lungs
generally show less than 20,000 fibers per gram (38).
Electron microscopy is a more sensitive index of asbestos
exposure than light microscopy. It will detect 10 to 100 times
more fibers than seen by light microscopy. Fibers seen only by
light or electron microscopy, in the absence of parenchymal
fibrosis, indicates only that exposure to asbestos has occurred.
Additional studies are required to define the number of fibers in
the lungs of persons with a variety of occupational exposures,
and with varying periods of exposure, as well as in
nonoccupational populations.
Investigations have demonstrated that as many as a million
fibers per gram of dry tissue of chrysotile may be present in the
lungs from nonoccupational exposures in the general population.
By contrast, lungs containing a million fibers of amosite or
crocidolite per gram are considered to reflect substantial
occupational exposure to asbestos dust (39). An electron
microscopic field of necessity represents a small sample of the
lung and analysis of multiple fields is required to reflect the true
asbestos lung burden. In our opinion, additional studies on the
numbers and types of asbestos fibers in the lungs of control and
exposed persons must be performed to provide the informational
bases for interpretation of quantitative data concerning asbestos
fibers in the lung and their relation to the presence of asbestosis
or other asbestos related diseases.
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Exposure History
Numerous studies have shown that asbestosis has a relatively
close association with both the magnitude and the duration of
exposure to inhaled asbestos; the more intense and longer the
exposure, the greater the numbers of affected workers and the
greater the severity of their illness. There is no evidence that
casual or indirect exposure, such as occurs in the general
population, causes asbestosis. The major problem facing the
clinician is to assess whether an exposure has been sufficient to
cause disease. Although dust levels have been measured in
many industries for many years, they are not usually available to
or easily interpreted by clinicians. Nevertheless, some general
statements can be made. A careful sequential history of all
exposures to all potentially harmful substances is obviously
important. Particular attention should be paid to occupations in
which direct contact with asbestos has occurred. Consultation
with physicians trained in occupational medicine or with
industrial hygienists may be helpful in unclear cases.
Evidence of asbestosis has been found many years after
relatively brief but extremely heavy exposure. Such exposure
often occurred in the asbestos textile industry over 50 years ago
and has occurred more recently in workers who have not used
respiratory protection while spraying dry asbestos on steel
beams. Fortunately, such exposure is rare at this time. With
levels of exposure common in the past few decades, the latent
period between the state of the exposure and the discovery of the
manifestations of asbestosis is likely to be a minimum of 15
years, and more often considerably longer. With exposures
below the current recommended permissible exposure limit
value, asbestosis is not likely to be found during he course of a
working career. With proper engineering controls, work
practice, and where necessary, personal respiratory protective
devices, asbestosis should not occur.
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Clinical Diagnosis
In the usual clinical setting, the diagnosis of asbestosis has to be
made in the absence of histologic examination of lung tissue.
Open lung biopsy is rarely indicated in the assessment of
workers for compensation purposes. The benefit of the doubt
should be given whenever the clinical features and occupational
exposure data are compatible with the diagnosis. In most
instances, the clinician and epidemiologist must still rely on
indirect methods of diagnosing asbestosis. These principles of
diagnosis are based on observations from pathologically proven
cases. When biopsy is done, careful attention must be paid to
the sampling considerations mentioned above and the surgical
technique employed (40). Assessment of lung dust burden in
such biopsy material is desirable. Diagnosis of asbestosis does
not mean that measurable impairment of lung function or
physical disability is necessarily present.
Clinical Features
In advanced stages, asbestosis is a restrictive lung disease
associated with dyspnea, clubbing of the fingers, basilar crackles
and wide-spread irregular opacifications on roentgenograms.
The latter are usually more prominent at the lung bases. Pleural
thickening and calcification may also be present as noted above.
The vital capacity is usually reduced with preservation of the
FEV1/FVC ratio and gas exchange impaired. Cor pulmonale
may occur in advanced disease. When many or all of these
features are present the diagnosis is made without difficulty.
However, in the absence of the opportunity to examine lung
tissue microscopically, the diagnosis is always inferential. The
certainty increases with increasing numbers and severity of
typical clinical abnormalities.
The chest roentgenogram appears to be the most valuable
examination in diagnosing asbestosis. A diffuse irregular
interstitial pattern coupled with evidence of pleural disease, e.g.,
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plaques or extensive pleural thickening in a person with known
exposure, presents little diagnostic difficulty. The difficulty
with the use of the chest roentgenogram relates to the detection
of lesser degrees of interstitial fibrosis. Efforts have been made
to standardize the interpretation of roentgenograms in the
pneumoconioses. The most widely accepted and extensively
studied method for assessing the degree of roentgenologic
involvement in the pneumoconiosis was developed by the
International Labour Office and is currently called the ILO-1980
Classification (41). This scheme evolved from studies of miners
and focused initially on the detection of silicosis. The X-ray
appearance of silicosis is characterized initially by small
rounded opacifications. The classification was later broadened
to describe abnormalities which occur in asbestosis and do not
have a rounded appearance. These are fine, medium and coarse,
small irregular opacifications, and they are called s, t, and u,
respectively. The classification, originally developed for
describing radiologic changes in epidemiologic studies, has also
been used in the clinical context for case detection and/or
diagnosis. In the latter instance, the information given in the
chest radiograph is added to all other information about the
individual in order to arrive at a diagnosis.
The number of these abnormalities in a given area of the chest
film, whether rounded or irregular, is called their profusion. The
profusion was initially graded as 0 for none, 1 for slight, 2 for
moderate, and 3 for severe.
It became apparent, however, that even experienced readers had
difficulty in grading specifications into these categories in a
reproducible fashion. However, if observers were asked to give
two classifications, i.e., the one category they thought was most
likely and another which they thought might also be considered,
the observer reliability (i.e., in terms of reproducibility) was
considerably improved. This method of giving the observer two
options (the one he thought most likely and next most likely)
was called the expanded classification. It formed a 12-point
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scale that has proven to be very useful epidemiologically.
It is likely that an individual who develops asbestosis moves
more or less uniformly from the normal roentgenologic
appearances (-/0, 0/0, 0/1) to the abnormal (½, 2/1, 2/2, etc.).
The problem is that the interpretation of the lesser degrees of
abnormality on this scale is subjective and that numerous causes
of such roentgenologic shadowing other than asbestosis exist.
In the presence of marked diffuse pleural thickening, it is
difficult to diagnose or grade the severity of interstitial fibrosis.
Accordingly, criteria other than roentgenographic ones have
been sought.
Dyspnea
Asbestosis has been described as a monosymptomatic disease,
dyspnea being the major complaint of the affected individual
(42). There is no doubt that shortness of breath is common and
troublesome in individuals with clinically significant interstitial
fibrosis. Dyspnea, however, is a nonspecific symptom, common
in many other cardiopulmonary disorders, and it is particularly
subject to emotional factors likely to be relevant in instances of
suspected industrially-related disease. Accordingly, it is not
adequate to use dyspnea as the only evidence on which to base
a clinical diagnosis of asbestosis in an individual at risk.
Clubbing
Clubbing of the fingers occurs more commonly in asbestosexposed workers than in controls (43, 44, 45). The diagnostic
usefulness of clubbing is limited, however, by two important
considerations. There are many other causes of clubbing and
clubbing, when present, is a late finding in pulmonary asbestosis
(46). Since the majority of persons with significant asbestosis
do not have clubbing, and asbestos workers with clubbing may
have it for reasons other than pulmonary fibrosis, the diagnostic
usefulness of clubbing is limited.
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Basilar Crackles
Crackles have been recognized as a feature of asbestosis for over
50 years and are believed by many to be an early finding (47, 48,
49). They have been described as characteristic in their sound
("fine", "cellophane," "velcro," "close to the ear") and in their
bilateral, basilar distribution (50). They differ in quality and
timing from the crackles of bronchitis which tend to be fewer in
number and earlier in timing. Bronchitic crackling begins with
the beginning of inspiration and usually discontinues prior to
mid or late inspiration. Characteristically, the crackles of
interstitial fibrosis are pan inspiratory or have an end inspiratory
accentuation. They appear first at the bases in the mid-axillary
lines and tend to spread toward the posterior bases. As the
disease advances, the crackles become distributed at
progressively high levels up from the bases (50). They are often
difficult to distinguish from the crackles of congestive heart
failure. Reported rates vary, but about half of the persons
considered to have asbestosis on clinical grounds have crackles
(47, 51, 52, 53); prevalences in exposed populations range from
about 10-20%. Such prevalences depend on duration of
exposure, the age of the population, and prevalence of other
disease causing fine crackles. Observer variability exists in
chest auscultation, but this can be reduced by training and
waveform analysis (54, 55, 56). In summary, under carefully
controlled circumstances crackles can be useful in diagnosing
interstitial fibrosis. However, they are not also specific for the
interstitial fibrosis related to asbestos.
Pulmonary Function
The characteristic features of pulmonary asbestosis are those of
a restrictive lung disease, i.e., a reduction of lung volumes, with
inspiratory capacity and vital capacity being primarily affected,
functional residual capacity being less affected, and residual
volume even less. These changes are consistent with a decrease
in pulmonary compliance. Hypoxemia may be present at rest or
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develop with exercise. Diffusing capacity is also usually
impaired, depending on the extent of the disease. By contrast,
large airway function as reflected in the FEV1/FVC ratio is
generally well preserved. Review of the prediction formulas for
pulmonary function tests reveals there is no one set applicable
to all laboratories and patient populations. Predicted normal
values used in pulmonary function laboratories should be based
on regression equations from studies whose testing equipment,
methodologies and control populations most clearly resemble the
patients under study. Numerous studies have shown that the
effects of asbestos on lung function are dose related (57, 58, 59).
There is convincing evidence that an asbestos related pulmonary
abnormality can occur in the absence of definite radiologic
change. These pathologic changes of early asbestosis have been
demonstrated in biopsy material from asbestos-exposed
individuals with minimal or no radiologic abnormality (60).
Likewise, exposure response relationships for certain pulmonary
function abnormalities (including reduced lung compliance and
impaired flow at low lung volumes) have been demonstrated in
asbestos-exposed subjects without radiologic abnormalities or
reduction in vital capacity (58), and their occurrence
subsequently confirmed in large animal models with biopsy
confirmation of the associated pathologic changes. The
impairment associated with such abnormality is usually modest.
Diffusing Capacity
Diffusing capacity or transfer factor has been the subject of
numerous studies with somewhat conflicting results. In most
studies of unexposed populations it is lower in asbestos exposed
workers than in normal controls although not always at a
statistically significant level (44, 45, 57, 62, 63). There is not
always a clear relationship to dust exposure indices (58, 64). It
has, however, been shown to correlate with the severity of the
histologic lesion in interstitial fibrosis (64), and its reduction can
precede roentgenologic abnormalities. At this time a reduction
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of the diffusing capacity in an asbestos worker, in the absence of
other known causes for impaired gas exchange, would provide
suggestive evidence for asbestosis, but further population studies
are necessary to elucidate the precise role of this test.
Other Studies
Various other measurements have been employed for monitoring
persons exposed to asbestos. A reduction in roentgenologic lung
volume appears promising since it is applicable to serial studies
of patients, but it requires careful control of inspiration (66).
This approach has not yet been taken in a large number of
subjects exposed to asbestos.
Inspiratory capacity was shown to be suitable for surveillance of
workers but is not likely to add much more than vital capacity
(VC) as the two tests are highly correlated (59). This finding
suggests that tests for small airways disease might in the future
be applicable to early detection (67). In one study, neither
closing volume nor closing capacity correlated with the duration
of exposure or with the asbestos dust index (68). Gallium
scanning, bronchoalveolar lavage, and transbronchial biopsy
need further evaluation with respect to their usefulness in
diagnosing asbestosis. CT scanning is of particular value in
detecting and quantitiating pleural disease and aiding in the
differentiation of pleural from parenchymal disease. The value
of CT scanning in the detection of interstitial fibrosis also needs
to be further evaluated. Thus, at this time, criteria other than
crackles, restrictive lung functional abnormality, reduced
diffusing capacity of the lung (DL), and roentgenogram
consistent with interstitial fibrosis of 1/1 or more are either
impractical, of unproven value, or are not likely to yield
additional information because of their high correlation with one
of these four.
In our opinion, combinations of these abnormalities are more
reliable in terms of specificity, relation to duration of exposure,
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consistency, and predictive value; however, little work has
assessed combinations of abnormalities.
Combinations
Combinations of abnormal test results are not likely to prove
more effective in detecting the earliest changes in asbestosis.
Intuitively, one test is likely to become abnormal first. It is
likely that the first abnormality is not always the same one (e.g.,
one worker may have only an abnormal DL [69], and another
only crackles as the first manifestation). This has been
demonstrated with respect to restrictive lung function pattern
and reduced DL. It is likely that observations will have to be
made in large groups over long periods to delineate clearly the
best single test for early diagnosis of asbestosis if, indeed, a
single initial abnormality exists.
Differential Diagnosis
Streaky densities on chest films consistent with a parenchymal
disease have many causes. All alternative diagnoses must be
considered before accepting the presumptive diagnosis of
asbestosis.
Occasionally, asbestosis is coexistent with chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease. Evidence is accumulating that obstruction
may also be related to an individual's occupational exposure
(70). The relative importance of cigarette smoking and asbestos
in the development of the combined problem of restrictive and
obstructive disease may be difficult or even impossible to assess.
Since a not uncommon feature of asbestos exposure is bilateral
pleural thickening, the question arises as to the helpfulness of
such thickening in indicating that a patient with pulmonary
fibrosis has asbestosis. Indeed, asbestos appears to be a rather
potent stimulus for the development of pleural abnormalities.
Selikoff found pleural fibrosis in 65% of persons he studied 40
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years from the onset of their initial exposure to asbestos. With
patients with no known exposure to asbestos or other known
hazardous materials (71), the question arises as to whether an
indirect or occult exposure to asbestos might have caused the
pleural thickening. Severe diffuse pleural thickening is not
common even in asbestos exposure. It was present in only 2.5%
of the asbestos workers studied by Selikoff. Since there were no
controls in that study, it is difficult to be certain that asbestos
was the cause of the pleural fibrosis in those subjects. Indeed,
Gilson reported in 1969 that pleural thickening was found on
187 of 3,860 (0.05%) routine roentgenograms of the chest in
Great Britain (72). He conducted one of the few objective
studies of pleural thickening by comparing the asbestos exposure
of 113 of the 187 subjects with that of 113 age- and sex-matched
controls. He found "a slight but unimpressive excess of positive
histories of exposure to asbestos among the cases." Thus, it is
not necessary to assume an occult exposure to asbestos in every
instance of pleural thickening; the presence of pleural thickening
is not definitive evidence of asbestos exposure. In another
study, bilateral pleural thickening was found in 52 of 824
consecutive patients admitted to the hospital. Only 13 of these
52 had definite asbestos exposure as compared to 2 of 32 agematched controls. In contrast to the relatively nonspecific
finding of pleural thickening, the demonstration of pleural
plaques with or without calcification is better evidence of
asbestos exposure. Unfortunately, the latter usually occurs only
many years after the onset of the exposure, thus limiting
usefulness of early diagnosis.
A major problem exists in the differential diagnosis when more
than one disease is present, whether it is congestive heart failure,
COPD, or other chronic lung disease. There are diseases
unrelated to asbestos exposure but with similar symptoms, and
these may occur in some persons with asbestos exposure.
However, given a clear history of exposure to asbestos, a diffuse
interstitial fibrosis can be presumed to be due to the asbestos as
other forms of interstitial fibrosis are relatively uncommon. The
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prevalence of lesser degrees of interstitial fibrosis is not well
known and considerable caution has to be exercised in
attributing all such phenomena to asbestos exposure, either
known or occult.
Summary
This document has focused on clinically detectable interstitial
fibrosis due to asbestos exposure. While direct examination of
lung tissue is the most reliable method of diagnosis, as stated
above, this is rarely indicated in the assessment of workers for
compensation purposes. Open lung biopsy is indicated in our
opinion only when a clear health, rather than financial, benefit
is likely to be provided. In the absence of pathologic
examination of lung tissue, the diagnosis of asbestosis is a
judgment based on a careful consideration of all relevant clinical
findings. In our opinion, it is necessary that there be:
1.

A reliable history of exposure.

2.

An appropriate time interval between exposure and
detection (see pages 9-10)

Furthermore, we regard the following clinical criteria to be of
recognized value:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Chest roentgenographic evidence of type "s," "t," "u," small
irregular opacifications of a profusion of 1/1 or greater
A restrictive pattern of lung impairment with a forced vital
capacity below the lower limit of normal
A diffusing capacity below the lower limit of normal
Bilateral late or pan inspiratory crackles at the posterior
lung bases not cleared by cough

Of these, the findings on the chest roentgenogram are the most
important. When this criteria is not met, considerable caution is
warranted. The specificity of the above criteria increases with
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increasing numbers of positive criteria. As in all clinical
judgments, confounding variables, such as the presence of other
clinical conditions that affect these criteria, should be evaluated.
It is possible that interstitial fibrosis may be present even though
none of these criteria are satisfied, but, in our opinion, in these
circumstances the clinical diagnosis cannot be made.
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